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NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
 
Vietnam is tegenwoordig gekend als een van de meest dynamische opkomende landen, met 
snelle economische groei en ontwikkeling zoals gerapporteerd door de Wereldbank, in de Oost-
Aziatische regio. Hoewel de ontwikkeling van Vietnam over de voorbije 30 jaar (na de “Doi moi” 
in 1986) opmerkelijk is, moet Vietnam nog steeds veel problemen oplossen om betere 
omstandigheden voor economische gezondheid en ontwikkeling te creëren. Volgens het rapport van 
de Heritage Foundation heeft Vietnam een score van 53,1 voor economische vrijheid, is Vietnam 
nummer 141 in een ranglijst van 180 landen en wordt Vietnam gekenmerkt als “voornamelijk 
onvrij”. Ook al zijn vele sub-indices verbeterd doorheen de tijd, toch zijn de meeste nog steeds laag. 
Als Vietnam zijn economie gezonder wil maken, moet het land de noodzaak erkennen om door te 
gaan met staatsbedrijven te hervormen, het reguleringsregime te verbeteren, het transparantieniveau 
te verhogen, het zwakke juridisch systeem te versterken en de bureaucratie te verminderen. Een beter 
lokaal bestuur kan een goed middel zijn om de ontwikkeling te pushen en de gezondheid van de 
Vietnamese economie te verbeteren. In deze dissertatie onderzoeken we de rol van bestuur als de 
input voor de productie van bedrijven door 3 problemen bij bestuur te beschouwen, namelijk 
corruptie, politieke connecties en sociaal kapitaal. De resultaten van deze dissertatie kunnen worden 
gebruikt als referentie voor een Vietnamese overheid met een beter begrip en een bredere uitkijk 
over de impact van lokaal bestuur op het verbeteren van de hele economie. 
Het eerste onderzoeksproject onderzoekt de relatie tussen corruptie en bedrijfsgroei. Door 
verschillende eigendomsidentiteiten, waaronder staatsbezit, aandeelhouder en in buitenlandse 
handen, te gebruiken vinden we dat corruptie schadelijk kan zijn voor economische groei, vooral 
voor de bedrijfsgroei van aandeelhoudende bedrijven en bedrijven in buitenlands handen, en dat 
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corruptie staatsbedrijven bevoorrecht. Daarnaast kan het verbeteren van de kwaliteit van de lokale 
zakelijke omgeving corruptie intomen. 
Het tweede onderzoeksproject onderzoekt of bedrijven voordeel kunnen halen uit hun politieke 
connecties. Wanneer we twee soorten politieke connecties, namelijk toegekende en verworven 
connecties, beschouwen, concluderen we dat bedrijven met beide soorten politieke connecties een 
lagere bedrijfswaarde hebben dan bedrijven zonder politieke connecties. Niettemin vinden we ook 
dat bedrijven met verworven politieke connecties en een geconcentreerde eigendomsstructuur een 
hogere bedrijfswaarde tonen dan bedrijven met een verspreide eigendomsstructuur en bedrijven die 
geen politieke connecties hebben. We vinden ook dat bedrijven met verworven politieke connecties 
een hogere bedrijfswaarde hebben dan bedrijven met toegekende politieke connecties. 
 Het derde onderzoeksproject onderzoekt of sociaal kapitaal, waaronder menselijk kapitaal op 
microniveau en sociale netwerken op macroniveau, een impact heeft op kredietbeslissingen en de 
groei van Vietnamese ‘home-based’ bedrijven. De resultaten tonen aan dat beide niveaus van sociaal 
kapitaal de informele lening keuze en de kredietkeuze tussen formele en informele leningen 
beïnvloeden. Ze tonen ook dat enkel het microniveau een impact heeft op de groei van ‘home-based’ 
bedrijven. 
De dissertatie verloopt als volgt: hoofdstuk 1 behandelt het eerste onderzoeksproject dat de 
impact van corruptie op bedrijfsgroei onderzoekt. Vervolgen onderzoekt het tweede hoofdstuk de 
associatie tussen politieke connecties en bedrijfswaarde. Hoofdstuk 3 gaat over de impact van sociaal 
kapitaal op kredietkeuzes en de groei van ‘home-based’ bedrijven. Het laatste hoofdstuk vormt de 
conclusie van deze dissertatie en brengt ook enkele praktische implicaties, beperkingen en suggesties 
voor toekomstig onderzoek naar voor. 
 
 1 
OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Vietnam is now known as one of the most dynamic emerging countries in East Asia, with rapid 
economic growth and development as reported by World Bank. Although the development of 
Vietnam over the last 30 years (after the “Doi moi” in 1986) is remarkable, but Vietnam now still 
needs to solve many problems to create a better environment for the economy and development. 
Based on the report of the Heritage Foundation, Vietnam’s economic freedom score is 53.1, ranked 
at 141 out of 180 countries and in the group of “mostly unfree”, with many sub-indices at a low 
level, although improving. In order to improve the economic health, Vietnam has to acknowledge 
the need to continue in reforming state-owned enterprises, improving regulation, increasing the level 
of transparency, bolstering the weak judicial system and decreasing the bureaucracy. A better local 
governance can be seen as a promising tool to push the development and improve the health of the 
Vietnamese economy. In this dissertation, we explore the role of governance as the input in 
producing firms’ output by considering three issues of governance, including corruption, political 
connections and social capital. The results from this dissertation can be seen as references for 
Vietnam’s Government for a better understanding and a broader view on the impacts of local 
governance in improving the economy as a whole. 
The first research project examines the relation between corruption and firm growth. By using 
different ownership identities including state-owned, shareholding and foreign-owned enterprises, 
we find that corruption may harm economic growth, especially for the firm growth of shareholding 
and foreign-owned enterprises, but it favors state-owned enterprises. Besides, improving the quality 
of local business environment can help to mitigate corruption.  
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The second research project investigates whether firms can benefit from their political connections. 
By considering two types of political connections including ascribed and acquired ones, we conclude 
that firms with both types of political connections have lower firm value than those without political 
connections. However, acquired political connected firms with concentrated ownership exhibit 
higher firm values than those with diffuse ownership and non-political connected firms. We also 
find that firms with acquired political connections have higher firm values than those with ascribed 
political connections. 
The third research project examines whether social capital, both on the micro level for human 
capital and the macro level for social network affects credit choices and growth of Vietnamese 
household businesses. The results document that both levels of social capital have an impact on 
informal loan choice and credit choice priority between formal loan and informal loan, but only the 
micro level has an effect on the growth of household businesses.  
The dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter 1 is the first research project that examines the 
impact of corruption on firm growth. It is followed by the second chapter that investigates the 
association between political connections and firm value. Chapter 3 is about the impact of social 
capital on credit choices and growth of household businesses. The final chapter concludes and 
summarizes and also provides some practical implications, limitations and suggestions for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
CORRUPTION, BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT AND FIRM GROWTH IN 
VIETNAM1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
1 This chapter is a joint work with Bao Bao Vuong (University of Economics, The University of Danang) and Michael 
Frömmel (UGent). 
Financial support from VIED is gratefully acknowledged. We gratefully acknowledge helpful comments and suggestions 
from participants at the 2017 Vietnam International Conference in Finance (VICIF), the 2017 International Conference 
of Accounting and Finance (ICOAF), the 2017 Vietnam’s Business and Economics Research Conference (VBER) and 
the 2018 FEB research day at Ghent University, especially Hanh Minh Thai, Dat Thanh Nguyen and Dries Heyman (our 
discussants). Yves Robinson Kruse-Becher has provided helpful advice on dealing with endogeneity in this chapter. We 
gratefully acknowledge the receipt of the Best Presentation Award at ‘‘Vietnam’s Business and Economics Research 
Conference 2017”. We are grateful to the World Bank, The Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) and 
the Vietnam Competitiveness Initiative (VNCI) for providing their data. 
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ABSTRACT 
Corruption is fought by governments in both developing and developed countries since it can harm 
economic development. However, it has raised the question of why it still exists at a high level in 
emerging markets like Vietnam? With the data from surveys of World Bank, Vietnam Competitive 
Initiative and Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the study provides details of the impact 
of corruption on firm growth and the effect of business environment on corruption at the firm-
perceived level across different firm’s ownership identities: state-owned enterprise (SOE), 
shareholding enterprise (SHE) and foreign-owned enterprise (FOE) in Vietnam. We demonstrate 
that corruption has a negative effect on the growth of firms with SHEs, FOEs and non-SOEs but 
positive in SOEs. We also document that the difference in the levels of corruption across different 
provinces can be influenced by the quality of the local business environment, but again, those 
impacts are heterogeneous in firms with different ownership identities. 
Keywords: Business Environment; Corruption; Firm growth; Emerging Market. 
JEL classification: G32, G38, O16, O53 
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1.1 Introduction 
Corruption is a major issue in society and economics. Accordingly, interest in fighting 
corruption has increased. From 1998 to the present day, 42 countries have ratified the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention, complemented by the United Nation’s convention against corruption from 2005 
and the World Bank’s Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on Governance and 
Anticorruption (GAC) strategy launched in 2007. At the same time, academic interest in corruption 
has increased, resulting in numerous research articles, some of which are reviewed later in this 
article. 
While corruption also occurs in developed countries, including some rather spectacular cases, 
it is really widespread in developing and emerging economies, and has become part of everyday life. 
“In the developing world, corruption is public enemy number one”, as World Bank president Jim 
Yong Kim stated2. In order to effectively fight corruption, however, it is crucial for policy makers 
and regulators to understand both the causes and effects of corruption.  
In their recent survey, Eugen and Tosato (2017) discuss the results of empirical research on 
factors pushing corruption and its impact on the economy and society. A couple of factors reported 
there point at business environment, in which both firms and officials act. What is missing in the 
empirical literature up to now is an analysis of the impact of corruption across different ownership 
                                                       
2 See the World Bank’s press release from December 19, 2013   
(http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/12/19/corruption-developing-countries-world-bank-group-
president-kim)   
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identities. The aim of our chapter is to close this gap. We look at how SOE3 vs. non-SOE, FOE4 vs. 
non-FOE, and SHE vs. non-SHE as different ownership identities affect the results. 
This analysis is carried out for the case of Vietnam for several reasons. First, Vietnam shows 
the typical picture of an emerging market with all of their characteristic features (Meyer and Nguyen, 
2005). Second, Vietnam is ranked 112 out of 168 countries in the 2015 Global Corruption Report5 
(where the country with the highest corruption level is ranked at 168). Therefore, corruption is 
prevalent in Vietnam and informal payment can advance firms in doing business. At the same time, 
it is an increasingly important market in South-East Asia with a high growth rates and an increasing 
share in international trade. Third, Vietnam is characterised by a high share of SOEs, which have 
good relationships with the government, which they benefit from, and of course political connections 
come with both formal and informal costs for the firms (Ha and Frömmel, 2016). Last but not least, 
Vietnam is known as a new potential market, which brings many opportunities for foreign investors. 
However, the government is still putting much effort to improve business environment in order to 
attract more foreign investment.  
Our contribution to the literature is threefold: 
First, although a couple of studies have investigated the impact of corruption on the economy, 
the role of firm ownership identity has been neglected so far. None of the existing studies focused 
on the different impacts of corruption on firm growth and business environment on corruption at the 
firm perceived level across the different ownership identities. Nguyen and van Dijk (2012), whose 
                                                       
3 is defined if the government owns more than 50% of the firm’s shares or voting rights. 
4 is defined if the foreign investors owns more than 20% of the firm’s shares or voting rights. 
5 Vietnam scored 31 in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which ranges between 100 (highly clean) and 0 (highly 
corrupt). The information is available at http://www.transparency.org/country#VNM 
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study is closest to ours, analyse the effect of corruption on firm growth and governance. However, 
they exclusively focus on the difference between SOEs vs. non-SOEs. We extend their work and 
make a finer distinction by furthermore distinguishing SHEs vs. non-SHEs and FOEs vs. non-FOEs 
resulting in three binary variables for ownership identity, which are analysed jointly. We hope this 
gives a better understanding of the effects of business environment on corruption and of corruption 
on firm growth across different firm’s ownership identities: SOE, SHE and FOE. We believe that 
ownership identity of firm is the main factor, which has a moderation influence on the effects of 
corruption on firm growth and business environment on corruption. Extending the work by Nguyen 
and van Dijk (2012), we strongly think that the difference in those effects between SOEs and non-
SOEs is easily understood by the strong political relationship of SOEs with the government, other 
differences between SHEs vs. non-SHEs and FOEs vs. non-FOEs are supported by agency theory. 
By dividing the whole economy into different firm’s ownership identities, the results as new 
evidence can help to fill the gap of literature for a better understanding about corruption. 
Second, we analyse the impact of business environment on corruption by comparing 
Vietnamese provinces. These provinces show some variations in their institutional characteristics 
and allow us to determine the effect of business environment on corruption. Here again we rely on 
our finer distinction in the ownership structure.  
Third, we extent the data set by Nguyen and Van Dijk (2012) and analyse data obtained from 
surveys conducted in 2005, 2009 and 2015, while Nguyen and Van Dijk relied on 2005 only, which 
results in a much higher accuracy of our estimates. The first survey is the “Enterprise Survey” 
conducted by the World Bank. This dataset includes firm characteristics, financial information and 
firms’ assessments of various aspects of the local business environment. The second survey is the 
“Vietnam Provincial Competitiveness Index Survey” organised by the Vietnam Competitive 
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Initiative (VNCI) and the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) in the same 
timeframe as the World Bank surveys. This dataset comprises the information about the business 
environment indicators and the Province Competitiveness Index (PCI). We collected the data for 
firms that took part in the World Bank surveys in all conducted years, 2005, 2009 and 2015. After 
eliminating the firms with unavailable information, we ended up with 2,820 firm-year observations. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 introduces the 
empirical approach and the data while section 4 presents the results of our analysis. Section 5 of the 
chapter summarises and concludes the research. 
 
1.2 Literature review 
1.2.1 Corruption 
Prior to investigating the relation between corruption and firm growth and other research 
questions, it is necessary to understand what corruption is. According to a definition established by 
the World Bank (1997) and Transparency International, corruption is the abuse of entrusted power 
(public power) for private gain. More specifically, the public officer uses his/her power for personal 
purposes to violate the order of the normal business process (Jain, 2001). Generally, there are two 
types of corruption: petty corruption and grand corruption (World Bank). Moreover, according to 
World Bank’s definition, corruption consists of three main factors: offering, giving or receiving 
something that affects public officers in the process of purchasing or conducting contracts; frauds 
leading to false values; and purchasing activities that violate the principles. Corruption is considered 
to be a type of rent-seeking (the underwriting of the campaigns of legislators, bribery, lobbying and 
political violence), though there is a difference between them. For instance, bribery can be listed as 
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a form of lobbying but, at the same time, they can be distinguished by questioning whether or not 
the decisions of involved people are affected. 
Corruption may affect economic performance in many ways (Jain, 2001). Firstly, corruption 
turns out to belong to the grease-the-wheels-of-bureaucracy kind. Secondly, corruption has an effect 
on bureaucratic efficiency. Thirdly, corruption can affect resources allocation. Lastly, corruption can 
have a relationship with the distribution of income and wealth. 
According to the nature of corruption, it is understandable why corruption still exists, 
especially in emerging markets. The features of emerging markets give public officials considerable 
discretion over a wide range of economic activities and, therefore, opportunities for extorting 
payments (Enderwick, 2012). 
1.2.2 Corruption and firm growth 
Since corruption has become a controversial topic, the effects of corruption on firms’ growth 
have been added to the to-research list of many financial economists. Three main types of results 
have been found by those researchers: positive relationship, negative relationship or both between 
corruption level and firm growth. 
On the one hand, corruption harms firm growth (Fisman and Svensson, 2007; Nguyen and van 
Dijk, 2012; Larmour, 2006; Goedhuys, Mohnen and Taha, 2016; Seker and Yang, 2014). By 
studying 243 Ugandan firms in the first half of 1998, Fisman and Svensson (2007) indicate that, 
similar to taxation, bribery has a negative effect on firms’ growth (short-term) and this effect is even 
greater than that of taxation. More interestingly, according to a study in the context of Kenya – 
corruption not only dampens firms’ growth but it also spoils firms’ spirits to export (Larmour, 2006). 
Larmour also find that the exposure to corruption depends on the firm’s size. Specifically, small and 
medium-sized firms are more exposed than very small and very large ones. In addition, in a study 
10 
 
about 3489 firms from Egypt (2897) and Tunisia (592), Goedhuys, Mohnen and Taha (2016) find 
that corruption is likely to have a significant negative relationship with firm growth. Using a model 
with corruption level and innovation as the two independent variables and firm growth as the 
dependent variable, it is found that there is a significantly negative coefficient of the corruption 
variable (Goedhuys, Mohnen and Taha, 2016). Far away from Africa, Seker and Yang (2014) 
conduct a large study of 6639 firms from 29 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. They 
find that bribery remarkably damages firm growth. 
Furthermore, in some cases, this unexpected effect of corruption on firm growth exists only in 
some types of enterprises. As described in the study of 741 private firms and 133 SOEs in Vietnam, 
Nguyen and van Dijk (2012) find that corruption has a negative effect on private sector growth, but 
not the state sector. This problem may come from the close relationship between SOEs and public 
officials (Nguyen and van Dijk, 2012). 
On the other hand, corruption may actually improve efficiency and help growth, especially in 
the context of pervasive and cumbersome regulations in developing countries (Wang and You, 2012; 
Hasan and Pinar, 2014). With a huge data set of 12212 Chinese firms, Wang and You (2012) 
interestingly find that, to some extent, corruption is likely to support firm growth. More specifically, 
corruption has a positive correlation with the growth of firms’ sales income. Meanwhile, a study of 
41 manufacturing firms in Turkey indicated that there is a remarkably positive relationship between 
corruption level and private firms’ growth (Hasan and Pinar, 2014). 
Another possibility would be a double-edged sword between corruption and firms’ growth 
(Sharma and Mitra, 2015). In their research of 2287 Indian enterprises, Sharma and Mitra use two 
sets of variables: macroeconomic-based and firm-based. While the former consists of factors that 
are related to government interaction, the latter includes firm-specific features, such as size, age, 
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ownership, innovation, international exposure and competitions. The results are mixed: ‘grease the 
wheels’ as well as ‘sand the wheels’. More specifically, bribes act as a kind of tax resulting in a 
decrease in efficiency, whilst bribery also supports firms in exporting and product innovation 
(Sharma and Mitra, 2015). 
1.2.3 Business environment and corruption 
Apart from the relation between corruption and firm growth, this study also explores the 
influence of the local business environment and corruption in relation to different types of 
ownership. By studying this influence, we may answer the question of what really controls 
corruption and make suggestions for adjustments to business environment in order to minimise the 
likelihood of corruption and thus, to some extent, attract more investment. 
Obviously, corruption usually goes along with a poor business environment, and vice versa. 
For instance, SMEs in the Philippines operating in cities with poorer business environment are more 
likely to be affected by corruption (Mendoza & Bancolita, 2013). It is supported by the study of 
Nguyen and van Dijk (2012) that the quality of local public governance, including regulatory entry 
costs, land access, and the implementation and consistency of policies, plays a crucial role in 
determining the level of corruption. Enhancing public governance quality may result in a decrease 
in corruption level, as well as reducing corruption’s effects on the economy. Furthermore, according 
to Dzhumashev (2014), instead of focusing on bureaucrats, the policies should target tax evaders in 
order to be more effective regarding both mitigating corruption and enhancing the potential growth 
of an economy. 
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1.2.4 Effects of different ownership identities 
As explained at the introduction part of the chapter, three different firm’s ownership identities 
are studied in this chapter: SOE, SHE and FOE. The effects of corruption on the growth of each type 
of firm listed above are different. 
As far as SOEs are concerned, SOEs’ managers usually have a close relationship with 
governmental authorities (Nguyen and van Dijk, 2012). Furthermore, in Vietnam, former executives 
of SOEs are often likely to climb the political ladder. Based on the above statements, SOEs’ 
managers tend to have rent-seeking behaviour, which does not add any national value, to get better 
conditions for their businesses. These advantages can be large, especially in the case of the heavy 
bureaucracy in developing countries like Vietnam. 
Turning to FOEs, investors in this type of firm usually take transparency into account when 
making investment decisions or adjusting the existing capital. Thus, as corruption lowers the level 
of transparency of business environment, foreign direct investment probably decreases. More 
specifically, corruption makes local bureaucracy less transparent and therefore acts as a kind of tax 
on foreign investors (Wei, 1997; Wei, 1998; Wei, 2000; Smarzynska and Wei, 2002). They found 
that an increase in corruption level (from a low percentage in Estonia to a high one in Azerbaijan) 
led to a drop of 15 percent in foreign investment. 
As for SHEs, the existence of corruption means that the board of directors have to adapt to the 
situation by spending an amount of money for unclear reasons. Corruption provides less-productive 
firms with incentives by giving those firms contracts. This acts as a barrier for firms that aim to 
increase productivity and maximizing their value (David et al., 2016). According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), there is a difference in the interests of bondholders (preferring stability and safe 
investments) and shareholders (preferring higher returns with higher risk), and this results in a 
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conflict between risk-seeking shareholders and corrupt managers. Finally, all those things result in 
an increase in agency cost, and firm growth might be affected negatively. 
Table 1.1 clearly summarizes previous research on the relationship between corruption and 
firm growth as well as the effects of the local business environment on corruption in different 
markets. 
 
[Insert Table 1.1 here] 
 
1.3 Methodology 
1.3.1 Corruption and firm growth 
To examine the impact of corruption on the firm growth, we used the equation (1) as follow: 
 
GROWTHit = β0 + β1 CORRUPTION + β2 CONTROLSit + eit 
 
Firm growth (GROWTH) is determined by using the ratio of sales growth. We use firm 
characteristics including firm age (AGE), firm size (SIZE), innovation (INNO) and female 
ownership (FO) as the control variables. We expect that firm age (AGE) has a negative impact on 
growth, since growth tends to slow down as firms mature (Nguyen & Van Dijk, 2012). AGE is 
measured as the total number of years from the establishment (Isidro & Sobral, 2014; Kabir & Thai, 
2017). SIZE is the natural logarithm of total sales (Nguyen & Van Dijk, 2012). The effect of firm 
size (SIZE) is ambiguous: smaller firms tend to have more opportunities for growth (Konijn et al., 
2011), but bigger firms have a more capacity to speed up growth. Innovation (INNO) is known as 
one of the driving forces for growth (Nguyen & Van Dijk); INNO is a binary variable, and equals 
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one if the firm introduced new or significantly improved products or services and zero otherwise. 
The owner’s gender affects the level of the firm’s risk: it is smaller if the owner is female (FO) 
compared with a male owner, in which matter in terms of firm performance and growth (Khan & 
Vieito, 2013). FO equals one if at least one of the firm’s owners is female and zero otherwise. 
CORRUPTION is measure by two proxies: (1) IPDUM is a binary variable; it equals one if the firm 
thinks that establishments (not necessary the firm itself) are required to make gifts or informal 
payments to public officials to “get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, 
services etc. and zero otherwise; (2) IPAMOUNT is the ratio of informal payments that the 
establishments (not necessary the firm itself) pays (estimated by the firm) over the annual sales.  
We use State-owned enterprise (SOE), foreign-owned enterprise (FOE) and shareholding 
enterprise (SHE) as different binary variables to determine the difference in the impact of corruption 
on firm growth in different types of ownership. In each variable, the value equals one if the firm is 
a SOE/SHE/FOE and zero otherwise.  
1.3.2 Business environment and corruption 
To further explore the influence of the local business environment and corruption in different 
types of ownership; the equation (2) of the study is as follow: 
 
CORRUPTIONit = β0 + β1 PCIit + β2 CONTROLsit + eit 
 
We use the provincial competitiveness index (PCI) provided by VNCI and VCCI as the 
determinants of corruption. The overall PCI includes ten sub-indices, reflecting economic 
governance areas that affect private sector development. A province with better PCI is the one with: 
1) low entry costs for business start-up; 2) easy access to land and security of business premises; 3) 
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a transparent business environment and equitable business information; 4) minimal informal 
charges; 5) has limited time requirements for bureaucratic procedures and inspections; 6) limit 
crowding out of private activity from policy biases toward state, foreign, or connected firms; 7) 
proactive and creative provincial leadership in solving problems for enterprises; 8) developed and 
high-quality business support services; 9) sound labor training policies; and 10) fair and effective 
legal procedures for dispute resolution6. 
We continue to use firms’ characteristics including AGE, SIZE, INNO and FO as the control 
variables since we think that those variables have an impact on corruption at the firm-perceived 
level. We expect that AGE and SIZE have positive effects on corruption as in a high corrupt country 
like Vietnam, mature and bigger firms are likely to have more experience on dealing with the local 
government to get benefits. We expect that the effect of innovation on corruption is mixed. On the 
one hand, technological innovation (INNO) helps firms to depend less on the goodwill from public 
authorities. However, on the other hand, firms may need to work more with public authorities for 
the permits, licenses or land access if they apply for new technologies; therefore, they are more likely 
willing to pay for avoiding complex bureaucracy. We also consider the owners’ gender as a control 
variable with mixed effects. On the one hand, female owners are more sensitive than male ones to 
the perception of corruption especially in highly corrupt countries. However, on the other hand, firms 
with female owners (FO) are likely to have a lower risk level but a more flexible management style 
than the ones with exclusively male owners. Besides that, female owners are less likely to engage in 
corruption because this may raise the costs of doing business (Xia et al., 2018); hence, firms with 
female owners can show a lower level of corruption.  
 
                                                       
6 Available at http://eng.pcivietnam.org/about/about-pci/ 
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1.4 Variable measurement and data 
1.4.1 Variable measurement 
Our choice of variables is based on the literature and the data surveys by the World Bank, 
VNCI and VCCI. We use sales growth to measure firm growth (GROWTH). Corruption is measured 
by two proxies including Informal Payment Dummy (IPDUM) and Informal Payment Amount 
(IPAMOUNT). IPDUM is a binary variable, which equals 1 if the firm perceives that there are 
informal payments to public officials in the industry, and 0 otherwise. The value is based on the 
perception of firm that sometimes establishments (not necessary the firm itself) are required to make 
gifts or informal payments to public officials to “get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, 
licenses, regulations, services etc.; And IPAMOUNT is the ratio of informal payments that the firm 
pays (estimated by the firm) over the firm sales.  
For the determinant of the local business environment, we used data obtained by the VNCI 
and VCCI survey, namely the Vietnam Provincial Competitiveness Index Survey. Provincial 
Competitiveness Index (PCI) is used to measure for local business environment. PCI on Vietnam’s 
business environment conducts an annual business survey, assessment and ranking of the economic 
governance quality of provincial authorities in creating a favorable business environment for 
development of the private sector7.  
Our control variables include AGE, SIZE, INNO and FO. AGE is firm age in years; SIZE is 
measured as the natural logarithm of total sales; INNO is a binary variable, which equals one if the 
firm introduced new or significantly improved products or services and zero otherwise; FO is a 
binary variable, equals one if at least one of the firm’s owners is female and zero otherwise. 
                                                       
7 See more at http://eng.pcivietnam.org/about/about-pci/ 
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For the variables of different firm’s ownership identities: SOE, SHE and FOE, for each 
variable, the value equals one if the firm is a SOE/SHE/FOE, and zero otherwise. 
The definitions of the variables are shown in Table 2. 
 
[Insert Table 1.2 here] 
When investigating the influences of corruption on firm growth and the local business 
environment on corruption, we shall address the problems of endogeneity. Previously, Svensson 
(2003) or Fisman and Svensson (2007) measure corruption at firm level as the bribery payments 
made by individual firms themselves. Hence, corruption may have an endogenous relation with firm 
growth, as growth affects a firm’s ability to pay informal charges (Svensson, 2003). In addition, 
corruption may affect firm’s investments since manager would be able to save money for corruption 
rather than for investment. This would result in a reduction of firm growth. However, in this chapter, 
these problems do not play important roles due to the specific measurement of corruption. It is 
measured based on the perception of firms regarding whether they need to make informal payments 
and the judgment about how corrupt the local business and industrial environments are, rather than 
the actual level of corruption that firms face. In this situation, industry and province dummies capture 
such endogenous effects of growth on our used measures of corruption (Nguyen & van Dijk, 2012).  
1.4.2 Data 
We use data collected from the surveys conducted in 2005, 2009 and 2015. The first survey is 
the “Productivity and Investment Climate Enterprise Survey” conducted by the World Bank. This 
dataset includes firm characteristics, gender participation, access to finance, annual sales, costs of 
factors/labor, workforce composition, bribery, licensing, infrastructure, trade, crime, competition, 
capacity utilization, land and permits, taxation, informality, business-government relations, 
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innovation and technology, and performance measures. More than 90% of the questions objectively 
ascertain characteristics of business environment in Vietnam. The survey focuses on all sectors 
according to the group classification of International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) 
Revision 3.1: manufacturing (group D), construction sector (group F), services sector (groups G and 
H), and transport, storage, and communications sector (group I). The second survey is the “Vietnam 
Provincial Competitiveness Index Survey” conducted by the VNCI and the VCCI in 2005, 2009 and 
2015. This dataset comprises province-level indicators of the quality of the business environment.  
We start with a panel of 3,199 firm-year observations including 1,150 observations in 2005, 
1,053 observations in 2009 and 996 observations in 2015. After removing the firms without 
information on total sales, the sample size of our study is 2,820 firm-year observations of 2,285 
firms, which include 2,052 observations in 2005, 867 observations in 2009 and 996 observations in 
2015. Those firms are located in 24 different provinces, namely An Giang, Bac Ninh, Ba Ria – Vung 
Tau, Binh Dinh, Binh Duong, Can Tho, Da Nang, Dong Nai, Hai Duong, Hai Phong, Ha Noi, Ha 
Tinh, Ho Chi Minh City, Thua Thien Hue, Khanh Hoa, Kien Giang, Long An, Nam Dinh, Nghe An, 
Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Thanh Hoa and Tien Giang. The indicators of the local business 
environment are shown by province and year in panel A of table 3. We also display the observations 
by provinces and years in panel B. Panel C shows information on the unbalanced observations over 
years, while panel D of the table presents the sample by ownership identities and years. In total, the 
sample includes 843 SHEs, 278 SOEs and 346 FOEs. Panel E provides information on corruption 
in SOEs, SHEs and FOEs over the years. In 2005, there are 150 corrupt SOEs over a total of 232 
SOEs, which accounts for 64.66%. These percentages are 47.43% and 38.51% in SHEs and FOEs 
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34.48 for FOEs. In 2015, 46.15% of SOEs are corrupt while these percentages are 37.76% and 
43.90% for SHEs and FOEs respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 1.3 here] 
 
1.4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1.4 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients of the variables 
employed in the analysis. The corruption level in Vietnam is high as 37% of the firms think that they 
have to pay informal charges when they run their business. Besides that, the surveyed firms think 
that the firms operating within their location or industry on average pay 3% out of their total sales 
to corrupt public officials. For business environment, there is a large range of PCI in the 13 
provinces, with the highest and lowest indexes of 38.81 and 76.82, respectively. In detail, table 1.4 
shows the variable descriptive statistics. 
 
[Insert Table 1.4 here] 
 
Table 1.5 presents the ownership types by year. Panel D details correlation coefficients of the 
variables. All correlation coefficients between independent variables are lower than 0.3, so the 
possibility of serious multi-collinearity can be excluded (Xia et al., 2014; Sun at al., 2016; Deng et 
al., 2018). IPDUM and IPAMOUNT are negatively related to firm growth (GROWTH). Besides 
that, PCI is negatively correlated with IPDUM and IPAMOUNT. 
 
[Insert Table 1.5 here] 
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1.5. Data analysis results 
1.5.1 Corruption and firm growth 
Table 1.6 shows the regression results for equation (1) with three panels for three different 
ownership identities: Panel A for SOE, panel B for SHE and panel C for FOE. We use sale growth 
to represent firm growth (GROWTH) as the dependent variable; CORRUPTION as the independent 
variable; firm age (AGE), firm size (SIZE), innovation (INNO) and female ownership (FO) as 
control variables; we include year, industry and province dummies to control for the effects of those 
variables in the model. Corruption is measured by two proxies: An informal payment dummy 
(IPDUM), which equals one if the firm believes that firms need to make informal payments to get 
“things done” and zero otherwise; and the informal payment amount (IPAMOUNT) for the ratio of 
the estimation of informal payment amount the firm needs to make over the total sales.  
As the data contains a panel dimension, problems can occur with regard to cross-sectional 
characteristics as heteroscedasticity or time-series characteristics as autocorrelation and omitted 
variables. With those problems, the fixed effects model and the random effects model are the most 
commonly used approaches (Kabir & Thai, 2017). We use the Breusch-Pagan test to choose between 
OLS and the random effects model; the Hausman test is used to decide whether the fixed or the 
random effects model is used; and the result of the F test shows whether the fixed effects model or 
OLS is more suitable. The results from those tests show that the fixed effects model is the most 
appropriate one for the full sample with interaction terms and OLS is chosen in cases of sub-samples. 
In panel A of table 1.6, the regression results from the fixed effects model for the full sample 
show that the coefficients of IPDUM and IPAMOUNT are all significantly negative; however, the 
coefficients on the interaction terms between SOE and corruption (IPDUM and IPAMOUNT) are 
significantly positive. Those results indicate that while corruption has a negative effect on firm 
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growth, it positive affects the growth of SOEs. We also estimate the regression for the sub-sample 
of non-SOEs to show clearly the effect of corruption on firm growth of private firms and find a 
significantly negative effect of corruption (IPDUM and IPAMOUNT) on the growth of non-SOEs. 
Generally, we find that corruption adversely affects the growth of private firms, while it does not 
hamper SOEs’ growth. Among the control variables, in the regression results for fixed effects model 
with full sample, the coefficients of SIZE and INNO are positively significant and the coefficients 
on the interaction term between SOE and FO are negatively significant. In case of sub-sample of 
non-SOEs, the coefficients of SIZE and INNO are positively significant while the coefficients of 
AGE are negatively significant. The positive coefficients of INNO is consistent with the explanation 
that technological innovation help non-SOEs to improve the growth. Besides, the positive 
coefficients of SIZE mean that larger sized private enterprises may have better firm growth than 
smaller sized ones. The negative coefficients of AGE tell that younger non-SOEs have higher firm 
growth than older ones. The negative coefficients on the interaction term between SOE and FO show 
that SOEs with female manager may have lower firm growth than those with male manager. 
Panel B of table 1.6 presents the regression results for SHE. The results from the fixed effects 
model for the full sample indicate that the coefficients of IPDUM and IPAMOUNT are insignificant 
but they turn to be significantly negative for both interaction terms between the two proxies for 
corruption (IPDUM and IPAMOUNT) and SHE. Again, we continue to estimate the regression for 
sub-sample of non-SHEs and find significantly positive coefficients in both cases of IPDUM and 
IPAMOUNT. The results clearly show that while corruption is negatively link with firm growth 
(GROWTH) of SHEs, it does not lower non-SHEs’ growth. Among the control variables, in the 
regression results for fixed effects model with full sample, the coefficients of SIZE and INNO are 
positively significant. In case of sub-sample of non-SHEs, the coefficients of SIZE and INNO are 
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positively significant while the coefficients of AGE are negatively significant. The positive 
coefficients of INNO is consistent with the explanation that technological innovation help non-SHEs 
to improve the growth. Besides, the positive coefficients of SIZE mean that larger sized non-SHEs 
may have better firm growth than smaller sized ones. The negative coefficients of AGE tell that 
younger non-SOEs have higher firm growth than older ones.  
The regression results from Panel C indicate that corruption has a negative effect on the growth 
of FOEs and non-FOEs. The coefficients of IPDUM and IPAMOUNT are significantly negative 
both for the full sample and the sub-sample of non-FOEs. The coefficients on the interaction terms 
between IPDUM, IPAMOUNT and FOE are also significantly negative. In sum, corruption harm 
the economic growth, especially the growth of FOEs. Among the control variables, in the regression 
results for fixed effects model with full sample, the coefficients of SIZE and INNO are positively 
significant. In case of sub-sample of non-FOEs, the coefficients of SIZE and INNO are positively 
significant while the coefficients of AGE are negatively significant. The positive coefficients of 
INNO is consistent with the explanation that technological innovation may help to improve the 
growth of non-FOEs. Besides, the positive coefficients of SIZE mean that larger sized non-FOEs 
may have better firm growth than smaller sized ones. The negative coefficients of AGE tell that 
younger non-FOEs have higher firm growth than older non-FOEs.  
 
[Insert Table 1.6 here] 
 
1.5.2 Business environment and corruption 
Table 1.7 presents regression results for equation (2). This table shows the impact of PCI as 
the measure of local business environment on whether the firm makes informal payments or not in 
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the spirit of our hypothesis that PCI is the determinant of corruption. We continue to use AGE, SIZE, 
INNO and FO as control variables. The table comprises three panels for three ownership identities 
including panel A for SOE, panel B for SHE and panel C for FOE. 
In panel A of table 1.7, the regression results for full sample show that the coefficients of PCI 
are significantly negative while the coefficients on the interaction term between PCI and SOE are 
significantly positive. We continue to estimate the regression by using the sub-sample of non-SOEs 
only. The coefficients of PCI are significantly negative. These coefficients indicate that the quality 
of the business environment (PCI) has a negative effect on corruption in non-SOEs but positive 
effect on corruption in SOEs. It is consistent with the explanation that when provinces provide better 
business environment, SOEs may be more willing to make informal payments to get benefit from 
public officials; however, non-SOEs are likely to avoid making informal payments in the 
competition with SOEs. Among the control variables, the coefficients of INNO are significantly 
positive for both the full sample and the sub-sample of non-SOEs. These positive coefficients 
indicate that non-SOEs with technological innovation may be more willing to make informal 
payments in comparison with those without innovation. 
The panel B of table 1.7 displays the regression results for SHE. Again, the results are shown 
for both the full sample and sub-sample of non SHEs. In case of the full sample, the coefficients of 
PCI are insignificant while the coefficients on the interaction term between PCI and SHE are 
significantly negative in both cases of IPDUM and IPAMOUNT. For the sub-sample of non-SHEs, 
the coefficients of PCI are not significant. The negative coefficients on the interaction term between 
PCI and SHE indicate that SHEs are likely to avoid of making informal payments if the provinces 
provide better business environment. The results also show that while the coefficients of AGE, SIZE 
and INNO are significantly positive for both the full sample and the sub-sample of non-SHEs, the 
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coefficients on the interaction terms between SIZE, INNO and SHE are significantly negative, and 
the coefficients on the interaction term between FO and SHE are significantly positive. These 
significant coefficients indicate that firm age (AGE), firm size (SIZE) and innovation (INNO) have 
positive effects on corruption in non-SHEs; firm size (SIZE) and innovation (INNO) have negative 
effects on corruption in SHEs. Besides, the positive coefficients on the interaction term between FO 
and SHE mean that SHEs with female owners (FO) may be more willing to make informal payments 
in comparison with SHEs with male owners. 
The results from panel C present that the coefficients of PCI are all insignificant in both cases 
of full sample and sub-sample of non-FOEs while the coefficients on the interaction term between 
PCI and FOE are significantly negative. Those coefficients indicate that PCI does not have any effect 
on corruption in non-FOEs but it has a negative effect on corruption in FOEs. It is consistent that 
FOEs are more likely to avoid of making informal payments if the provinces provide better business 
environment. Among control variables, the coefficients of AGE and INNO are significantly positive, 
the coefficients on the interaction terms between SIZE, INNO and FOE are significantly negative 
and the coefficients on the interaction term between FO and FOE are significantly positive. These 
coefficients provide that in non-FOEs, firm size (SIZE) and innovation (INNO) have positive effects 
on corruption while in FOEs, firm size (SIZE) and innovation (INNO) have negative effects, FO has 
a positive effect on corruption. 
It cannot be generally concluded that with the better business environment, the firms do not 
need to make informal payments since the results are heterogeneous among different types of firm’s 
ownership identity. In sum, SOEs may need to pay more for informal cost if they are located at the 
province with better PCI. However, the results are different with SHEs and FOEs. PCI in those firms 
has a negative effect on corruption (both IPDUM and IPAMOUNT). It reveals that higher PCI as 
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better business environment at provincial level can help those firms to avoid making informal 
payments. A higher point of PCI is an indicator for a better business environment, better local 
government with less bureaucracy, therefore, SHEs and FOEs do not need to make informal 
payments when they work with the local government. In contrast, it can be different with SOEs. 
Vietnamese SOEs receive many preferential treatments from the government. Hence, in any case, 
SOEs are always willing to pay for the benefits they get or even for maintaining the connections 
with politicians. However, in provinces with better PCI, it seems more difficult for SOEs to get close 
connections with the government in order to get the unfair-benefits; and therefore, they may need to 
pay even more. 
 
[Insert Table 1.7 here] 
 
1.6 Conclusions 
Based on theories such as agency theory and rent-seeking behaviour, along with previous 
literature about the relation between corruption and firm growth, this study has developed an 
empirical framework to analyse the effects of corruption on firm growth in Vietnam. The chapter 
adds to the corporate finance field by analysing previous empirical studies and determining the best 
explanatory variables. As a result, two regression equations have been built. The first equation 
comprises firm growth as dependent variable, corruption as independent variable, firm age (AGE), 
firm size (SIZE), innovation (INNO) and female owner (FO) as control variables. The second 
equation consists of corruption as dependent variable, PCI for local business environment as 
independent variable, and firm age (AGE), firm size (SIZE), innovation (INNO) and female owner 
(FO) as control variables. Furthermore, by reviewing theories (agency theory and rent-seeking 
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behaviour) and applying these equations to real data, this study has attempted to minimise the gap 
between theory and practice. 
The results of the regression models have pointed out the following relationships between 
corruption and firm growth. While corruption affects negatively firm growth in non-SOEs, SHEs 
and FOEs, it positively influences the firm growth of SOEs. Corruption, or so-called bribery, has a 
significant negative relationship with firm growth in shareholding and FOEs. This result supports 
the agency theory as bribery money may lead to information asymmetry and, therefore, an increase 
in agency cost along with the decrease in firm growth. Conversely, corruption has a statistically 
significant positive relationship with the growth of SOEs, which is consistent with the fact that a 
good relationship with government provides SOEs with advantages. While SOEs in Vietnam are 
known as the ones who have very strong relationships with Vietnamese Government; managers of 
SOEs are also known as politicians, and therefore, SOEs can benefit from their connections and of 
course, they have to pay for that.  
Turning to the effect of the local business environment on corruption, the associations differ 
between different types of firm’s ownership identity. While PCI has a negative effect on corruption 
in SHEs and FOEs, there is a positive effect in SOEs. It means that SHEs and FOEs located at 
provinces with higher PCI, as the overall indicator to measure the quality of business environment 
can have less probability of making informal payments than those in provinces with lower PCI. In 
contrast, it gets more difficult for SOEs to make informal payments in those provinces with higher 
PCI, therefore they are willing to pay more or need to pay more to get the preferential treatments 
from the local government.   
The results of this study can be the reference for Vietnamese Government in their business 
environment improvement process when it gives a broader view of the effect of corruption to the 
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whole economy by dividing into different firm’s ownership identities. When the number of SOEs is 
decreasing dramatically, the role of non-SOEs (private-owned enterprises), especially SHEs should 
be recognized as the most important economic sectors. Besides, in order to be an attractive economy, 
Vietnam should try to be more transparent and fairer to welcome more foreign investors come to do 
business. Generally, this study brings a broad view and provide policymakers with information and 
references on which to base rules or laws related to corruption. Practically, reforms in reducing time 
consuming and wasteful administrative procedures can improve the quality of business environment, 
which helps to reduce corruption. We do believe that if the problem of corruption is solved, Vietnam 
not only attract more foreign investors but also create a better business environment for the economic 
development.  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1.1 Summary of previous research results 
 
Author Year Data set Findings 
Nguyen and van Dijk 2012 741 private firms and 
133 SOEs 
They found that corruption hampers the growth of Vietnam’s private 
sector, but is not detrimental for growth in the state sector. 
Corruption may harm economic growth because it favours the state 
sector at the expense of the private sector; improving the quality of 
local public governance can help to mitigate corruption and stimulate 
economic growth 
Fisman and Svensson 2007 243 Ugandan firms They found that both the rate of taxation and bribery are negatively 
correlated with firm growth. A one-percentage point increase in the 
bribery rate is associated with a reduction in firm growth of three 
percentage points, an effect that is about three times greater than that 
of taxation. 
Wang and You 2012 12212 Chinese firms Corruption is likely to contribute to firms’ growth. 
Larmour 2006 279 Kenyan firms Corruption significantly dampens firm growth and the propensity to 
export. 
Hasan and Pinar 2014 41 manufacturing firms 
in Turkey 
They specifically found a significantly positive relation between the 
growth of private firms and corruption level. 
Goedhuys, Mohnen and 
Taha 
2016 3489 firms from Egypt 
(2897) and Tunisia 
(592). 
Corruption seems to have a direct negative effect on growth, as 
indicated by the negative and significant coefficient of the corruption 
variable. 
Seker and Yang 2014 6639 firms from 29 
countries in Latin 
America and Caribbean 
Bribery significantly distorts firm growth. 
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Table 1.1 (cont’d) 
 
Author Year Data set Findings 
Sharma and Mitra 2015 2287 Indian enterprises The findings on the effects of bribery on firms’ performance are rather 
mixed. They note that bribery works as a tax on the profitability of 
firms and reduces efficiency. However, the evidence is inconclusive 
relating to productivity. On the other hand, bribing has a positive effect 
on the firms’ exports and product innovation. 
Mendoza and Bancolita 2013 1700 SMEs in 29 
Philippine Cities 
More corruption is reported by firms located in cities with very poor 
business environment and weak provision of public goods. 
Dzhumashev 2014  The policies reducing tax evasion mitigate corruption and enhance 
growth. 
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Table 1.2 Variable definitions 
 
Panel A. The World Bank’s “Productivity and investment climate enterprise survey” 
 
Variable Definition 
Firm age  Firm age in years. 
Firm size  Natural logarithm of total sales (in million VND). 
Innovation  A binary variable, equals one if the firm introduced new or significantly improved 
products or services and zero otherwise. 
Female owner (FO)  A binary variable, equals one if at least one of the firm’s owners is female and 
zero otherwise. 
Informal Payment dummy (IP dummy)  A binary variable, which equals 1 if the firm perceives that there are informal 
payments to public officials in the industry, and 0 otherwise. The value is based 
on the perception of firm that sometimes establishments (not necessary the firm 
itself) are required to make gifts or informal payments to public officials to “get 
things done” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc.  
Informal Payment Amount (IP Amount)  The ratio of informal payments that the establishments (not necessary the firm 
itself) pays (estimated by the firm) over the annual sales. 
SOE  A binary variable for firm ownership identity, which equals 1 if the government 
owns more than 50% of the firm’s shares or voting rights and 0 otherwise. 
SHE  A binary variable for firm ownership identity, which equals 1 if the firm is 
shareholding firm and 0 otherwise. 
Shareholding enterprises are defined as shareholding companies with shares trade 
in the stock market, non-traded shares or shares traded privately. 
FOE  A binary variable for firm ownership identity, which equals 1 if the firm has 
foreign investors who hold at least 20% of the firm’s shares or voting rights and 
0 otherwise. 
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Panel A (cont’d) 
 
Variable  Definition 
Firm growth  Sales growth rate. 
Measured by the change in total sales between the beginning of the surveyed year 
and the beginning of the last year from the surveyed year. 
 
 
  
35 
 
Panel B. VNCI and VCCI’s “Vietnam provincial competitiveness index survey” 
 
Variable  Definition 
PCI  Provincial Competitiveness Index. 
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Table 1.3 Sample description 
 
Panel A. PCI by provinces and years 
 
Province 2005 2009 2015 
Cantho 61.29 62.17 59.81 
Danang 70.67 75.96 68.34 
Hanoi 60.32 58.18 59.00 
Haiphong 59.40 57.57 58.65 
Hochiminh City 59.61 63.22 61.36 
Bacninh 58.06 65.70 59.91 
Hatay 38.81 n/a n/a 
Haiduong 45.79 58.96 58.37 
Namdinh 45.97 52.60 59.62 
Binhdinh 60.60 65.97 59.23 
Hatinh 51.67 55.26 57.20 
Khanhhoa 54.08 58.66 58.69 
Nghean 59.56 52.56 58.47 
Quangnam 59.72 61.08 61.06 
Quangngai 47.99 52.34 59.70 
Thanhhoa 49.29 57.32 60.74 
Thuathienhue 56.77 64.23 58.52 
Binhduong 76.82 74.01 58.89 
Baria-Vungtau 59.15 65.96 59.51 
Dongnai 64.14 63.16 57.79 
Longan 58.49 64.44 60.86 
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Panel A (cont’d) 
 
Province 2005 2009 2015 
Angiang 50.90 62.47 57.61 
Dongthap 58.65 68.54 66.39 
Tiengiang 55.89 65.81 56.74 
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Panel B. Observations by years and provinces 
Province 2005 2009 2015 
Can Tho 35 33 31 
Da Nang 46 40 41 
Ha Noi 128 148 139 
Hai Phong 73 67 61 
Ho Chi Minh City 227 166 186 
Bac Ninh 18 7 18 
Ha Tay 43 n/a n/a 
Hai Duong 14 16 13 
Nam Dinh 31 20 36 
Binh Dinh 34 27 24 
Ha Tinh 22 15 25 
Khanh Hoa 36 33 29 
Nghe An 34 36 32 
Quang Nam 16 10 13 
Quang Ngai 8 5 7 
Thanh Hoa 60 54 52 
Thua Thien Hue 19 11 18 
Binh Duong 72 62 53 
Ba ria – Vung Tau 13 6 12 
Dong Nai 56 54 54 
Long An 33 30 24 
An Giang 14 6 13 
Dong Thap 7 4 7 
Tien Giang 13 17 13 
Total 1052 867 901 
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Panel C. Unbalanced observations over years 
 
Number of firm 2005 2009 2015 
741 x   
436  x  
666   x 
207 x x  
131  x x 
11 x  x 
93 x x x 
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Panel D. Ownership identities by years 
 
Year SHEs Non-SHEs Total SOEs Non-SOEs Total FOEs Non-FOEs Total 
2005 409 643 1,052 232 820 1,052 148 904 1,052 
2009 238 629 867 33 834 867 116 751 867 
2015 196 705 901 13 888 901 82 819 901 
Total 843 1,977 2,820 278 2,542 2,820 346 2,474 2,820 
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Panel E. Percentage of corrupt firms over years and ownership identities 
 
 2005 2009 2015 
SOE 64.66% 57.58% 46.15% 
SHE 47.43% 27.3% 37.76% 
FOE 38.51% 34.48% 43.90% 
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Table 1.4 Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
GROWTH 0.30 0.52 -0.51 1.4 
AGE 12.50 9.80 2.000 39 
SIZE 59,049.15 98,336.31 600 37,5546.5 
INNO 0.18 0.35 0.000 1.000 
FO 0.15 0.36 0.000 1.000 
IPDUM 0.37 0.48 0.000 1.000 
IPAMOUNT 0.03 0.04 0.000 0.14 
PCI 60.31 5.26 49.29 74.01 
SOE 0.10 0.30 0 1 
SHE 0.30 0.46 0 1 
FOE 0.12 0.32 0 1 
For variable definitions: see Table 1.2. 
All variables are winsorized at the 5% level. 
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Table 1.5 Correlation coefficients 
 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 GROWTH 1           
2 IPDUM -0.09 
*** 
1          
3 IPAMOUNT -0.06 
** 
0.73 
*** 
1         
4 AGE 0.04 
* 
0.06 
*** 
0.06 
*** 
1        
5 SIZE 0.12 
*** 
0.02 0.01 0.28 
*** 
1       
6 INNO 0.19 
*** 
-0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.04 
** 
1      
7 FO -0.11 
*** 
-0.12 
*** 
-0.08 
*** 
0.06 
*** 
0.04 
** 
0.23 
*** 
1     
8 SOE 0.03 0.18 
*** 
0.15 
*** 
0.36 
*** 
0.22 
*** 
-0.10 
*** 
-0.12 
*** 
1    
9 SHE 0.06 
*** 
0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.11 
*** 
-0.01 0.00 -0.13 
*** 
1   
10 FOE 0.05 
*** 
0.01 -0.02 -0.14 
*** 
0.12 
*** 
0.05 
** 
-0.10 
** 
-0.11 
*** 
0.21 
*** 
1  
11 PCI 0.04* -0.07 
*** 
-0.06 
*** 
-0.06 
*** 
0.05 
*** 
0.01 -0.04 -0.04 
* 
0.01 0.08 
*** 
1 
For variable definitions: see Table 1.2. 
*, **, *** for statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
All variables are winsorized at the 5% level. 
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Table 1.6 Estimation results: Corruption and firm growth 
 
Panel A. SOE 
 
Model # 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
FEM FEM OLS OLS 
Sample All firms All firms Non-SOEs Non-SOEs 
D. V.  Firm Growth Firm Growth Firm Growth Firm Growth 
  Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
IPDUM -0.2626*** 0.000   -0.2070*** 0.000   
IPAMOUNT   -2.1061*** 0.000   -1.6159*** 0.000 
AGE -0.0239 0.160 -0.0197 0.258 -0.0037*** 0.001 -0.0039*** 0.000 
SIZE 0.0870*** 0.000 0.0929*** 0.000 0.0408*** 0.000 0.0406*** 0.000 
INNO 0.5164*** 0.000 0.4968*** 0.000 0.4658*** 0.000 0.4572*** 0.000 
FO -0.0987 0.166 -0.0842 0.247 0.0377 0.276 0.0426 0.217 
SOE -0.9974* 0.090 -0.9552 0.109     
SOE*IPDUM 0.4255*** 0.001       
SOE*IPAMOUNT   2.5614* 0.065     
SOE*AGE 0.0013 0.837 -0.0004 0.945     
SOE*SIZE 0.0709 0.205 0.0819 0.142     
SOE*INNO 0.1983 0.308 0.1991 0.337     
SOE*FO -0.5464* 0.079 -0.5427* 0.088     
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Panel A (cont’d) 
 
     
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry controls No No Yes Yes 
Province controls No No Yes Yes 
F 19.06*** 16.55*** 18.39*** 15.91*** 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R Square 0.3219 0.2918 0.1882 0.1714 
Observation 2820 2820 2542 2542 
For variable definitions: see Table 1.2. 
*, **, *** for statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
All variables are winsorized at the 5% level. 
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Panel B. SHE 
 
Model # 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
FEM FEM OLS OLS 
Sample All firms All firms Non-SHEs Non-SHEs 
D. V.  Firm Growth Firm Growth Firm Growth Firm Growth 
  Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
IPDUM -0.0082 0.864   0.0912*** 0.000   
IPAMOUNT   -0.4629 0.392   0.7382** 0.013 
AGE -0.0282* 0.097 -0.0194 0.273 -0.0044*** 0.000 -0.0045*** 0.000 
SIZE 0.0869*** 0.000 0.0941*** 0.000 0.0364*** 0.000 0.0375*** 0.000 
INNO 0.4641*** 0.000 0.4946*** 0.000 0.3888*** 0.000 0.3964*** 0.000 
FO -0.1245 0.109 -0.1065 0.188 0.0491 0.204 0.0457 0.238 
SHE 0.3158 0.159 -0.0157 0.945     
SHE*IPDUM -0.5494*** 0.000       
SHE*IPAMOUNT   -3.8083*** 0.000     
SHE*AGE -0.0008 0.809 -0.0006 0.876     
SHE*SIZE -0.0067 0.755 0.0136 0.541     
SHE*INNO -0.0476 0.637 -0.0266 0.800     
SHE*FO -0.0005 0.996 -0.0481 0.673     
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry controls No No Yes Yes 
Province controls No No Yes Yes 
F 22.30*** 17.19*** 10.05*** 9.83*** 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Panel B (cont’d) 
 
     
R Square 0.357 0.2997 0.1478 0.1449 
Observation 2820 2820 1977 1977 
For variable definitions: see Table 1.2. 
*, **, *** for statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
All variables are winsorized at the 5% level. 
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Panel C. FOE 
 
Model # 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
FEM FEM OLS OLS 
Sample All firms All firms Non-FOEs Non-FOEs 
D. V.  Firm Growth Firm Growth Firm Growth Firm Growth 
  Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
IPDUM -0.1227*** 0.002   -0.0482** 0.025   
IPAMOUNT   -0.9141** 0.049   -0.3742 0.129 
AGE -0.0193 0.217 -0.0183 0.253 -0.0037*** 0.000 -0.0037*** 0.000 
SIZE 0.0942*** 0.000 0.0949*** 0.000 0.0413*** 0.000 0.0409*** 0.000 
INNO 0.4549*** 0.000 0.4539*** 0.000 0.3928*** 0.000 0.3890*** 0.000 
FO -0.0721 0.307 -0.0467 0.519 0.0498 0.147 0.0505 0.142 
FOE 0.6628 0.101 -0.0057 0.988     
FOE*IPDUM -0.7052*** 0.000       
FOE*IPAMOUNT   -5.8592*** 0.000     
FOE*AGE -0.001 0.901 -0.0038 0.630     
FOE*SIZE -0.0368 0.389 0.0274** 0.027     
FOE*INNO 0.1669 0.270 0.1519 0.330     
FOE*FO -0.2564 0.529 -1.0400** 0.010     
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry controls No No Yes Yes 
Province controls No No Yes Yes 
F 21.37*** 18.60*** 11.27*** 11.15*** 
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Panel C (cont’d) 
 
     
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R Square 0.3474 0.3166 0.134 0.133 
Observation 2820 2820 2474 2474 
For variable definitions: see Table 1.2. 
*, **, *** for statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
All variables are winsorized at the 5% level. 
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Table 1.7 Estimation results: Business environment and corruption 
 
Panel A. SOE 
 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) 
D. V.  IP Dummy IP Amount IP Dummy IP Amount 
Sample All firms All firms Non-SOEs Non-SOEs 
  Coef. 
p-
value 
Coef. 
p-
value 
Coef. 
p-
value 
Coef. 
p-
value 
PCI -0.0358*** 0.000 -0.0005*** 0.001 -0.0359*** 0.000 -0.0005*** 0.001 
AGE 0.0096* 0.056 0.0002 0.112 0.0095* 0.059 0.0002 0.114 
SIZE -0.0193 0.441 -0.0006 0.212 -0.0196 0.433 -0.0006 0.211 
INNO 0.4778*** 0.000 0.0065*** 0.007 0.4730*** 0.000 0.0066*** 0.006 
FO -0.1723 0.265 -0.0013 0.623 -0.178 0.250 -0.0011 0.669 
SOE -10.6668*** 0.000 -0.1262*** 0.000     
SOE*PCI 0.1723*** 0.000 0.0022*** 0.000     
SOE*AGE -0.0183 0.141 -0.0002 0.508     
SOE*SIZE 0.136 0.141 0.0012 0.562     
SOE*INNO 0.5056 0.398 0.0298** 0.048     
SOE*FO -0.5335 0.550 -0.0078 0.646     
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald Chi2/F 269.07*** 11.52*** 147.86*** 11.09*** 
Prob>Chi2/Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
  
51 
 
Panel A (cont’d) 
 
     
Pseudo R Squared/R Squared 0.077 0.0647 0.0496 0.0393 
Observation 2820 2820 2542 2542 
For variable definitions: see Table 1.2. 
*, **, *** for statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
All variables are winsorized at the 5% level. 
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Panel B. SHE 
 
Model # (5) (6) (7) (8) 
D. V.  IP Dummy IP Amount IP Dummy IP Amount 
Sample All firms All firms Non-SHEs Non-SHEs 
  Coef. 
p-
value 
Coef. 
p-
value 
Coef. 
p-
value 
Coef. 
p-
value 
PCI 0.003 0.755 0.0001 0.806 0.0035 0.718 0.0001 0.871 
AGE 0.0109** 0.044 0.0003*** 0.008 0.0093* 0.098 0.0003** 0.023 
SIZE 0.0950*** 0.001 0.0011* 0.048 0.0985*** 0.001 0.0011** 0.047 
INNO 1.0155*** 0.000 0.0152*** 0.000 1.2256*** 0.000 0.0177*** 0.000 
FO -0.4885*** 0.008 -0.0042 0.127 -0.2268 0.244 0.0003 0.900 
SHE 5.9243*** 0.000 0.0764*** 0.000     
SHE*PCI -0.0589*** 0.001 -0.0007** 0.037     
SHE*AGE 0.0115 0.242 -0.0001 0.753     
SHE*SIZE -0.2551*** 0.000 -0.0035*** 0.001     
SHE*INNO -1.7156*** 0.000 -0.0242*** 0.000     
SHE*FO 1.4133*** 0.000 0.0150*** 0.002     
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald Chi2/F 254.42*** 12.75*** 214.49*** 19.93*** 
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Panel B (cont’d) 
 
     
Prob>Chi2/Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R Squared/R Squared 0.0836 0.0648 0.1006 0.0832 
Observation 2820 2820 1977 1977 
For variable definitions: see Table 1.2. 
*, **, *** for statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
All variables are winsorized at the 5% level. 
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Panel C. FOE 
 
Model # (9) (10) (11) (12) 
D. V.  IP Dummy IP Amount IP Dummy IP Amount 
Sample All firms All firms Non-FOEs Non-FOEs 
  Coef. 
p-
value 
Coef. 
p-
value 
Coef. 
p-
value 
Coef. 
p-
value 
PCI -0.007 0.417 -0.0002 0.213 -0.0046 0.595 -0.0002 0.314 
AGE 0.0126*** 0.005 0.0003*** 0.006 0.0126*** 0.006 0.0002*** 0.007 
SIZE 0.0438* 0.084 0.0004 0.437 0.0444* 0.088 0.0004 0.445 
INNO 0.8442*** 0.000 0.0127*** 0.000 0.9751*** 0.000 0.0140*** 0.000 
FO -0.3259** 0.044 -0.0041 0.112 -0.1593 0.347 -0.0019 0.482 
FOE 6.3831*** 0.000 0.0493* 0.069     
FOE*PCI -0.0649*** 0.005 -0.0003 0.381     
FOE*AGE 0.0261 0.283 -0.0002 0.741     
FOE*SIZE -0.2308*** 0.004 -0.0026* 0.097     
FOE*INNO -2.4232*** 0.000 -0.0299*** 0.000     
FOE*FO 2.5707*** 0.000 0.0385*** 0.004     
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald Chi2/F 231.27*** 12.59*** 234.76*** 19.14*** 
Prob>Chi2/Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Panel C (cont’d) 
 
     
Pseudo R Squared/R Squared 0.0786 0.0616 0.0835 0.0664 
Observation 2820 2820 2474 2474 
For variable definitions: see Table 1.2. 
*, **, *** for statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
All variables are winsorized at the 5% level. 
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CHAPTER 2 
POLITICAL CONNECTION HETEROGENEITY AND FIRM 
VALUE IN VIETNAM8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
8 This chapter is a joint work with Michael Frömmel (UGent). 
Financial support from Vietnam International Education Cooperation Department (VIED) is gratefully 
acknowledged. We gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions from Henk Berkman; Youwei 
Li; Ruby Trinh; Bo Hu, the discussant at Belgian Financial Research Forum 2018 in Brussel, Belgium; Bezawit 
Chichaibelu, the discussant and also other participants at International Conference on Accounting and Finance 
2018 in Danang, Vietnam. 
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ABSTRACT 
The observation of firms’ political connections (PCs) in both types of ascribed and acquired 
PCs has raised the question of their benefits to firms’ operation. Based on 1,365 Vietnamese 
listed firm-year observations from 2010 to 2014, we find that although firms with both ascribed 
and acquired PCs have lower firm value (FV) than firms without any PCs, firms with acquired 
PCs exhibit better FV than those with ascribed PCs. The results also reveal that concentrated 
ownership (CO) has a moderation impact on the association between acquired PCs and FV 
while it can help firms with acquired PCs in improving FV.  
Keywords: Political connections; Concentrated ownership; Firm value. 
JEL classification: G32, G38, O16, O53. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The institutional environment affects the way in which corporations in emerging markets 
operate and behave. One of the key aspects in which firms in emerging markets differ from 
those in developed markets is in the level of PCs. Firms with PCs can enjoy many preferential 
treatments, such as bailouts from the government, advantaged regulations, benefits from tax 
policy and priority in access to finance (Johnson & Mitton, 2003; Khwaja & Mian, 2005; 
Faccio et al., 2006; Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001). Although corporate PCs appear to be 
widespread around the world, they are likely to be more pronounced in emerging markets due 
to the institutional features of such markets where markets fail and institutions are weak as 
characterized by weak rules of law, rampant corruption, government control of the press, a lack 
of accountability and transparency, government intervention in business activities and low 
quality public governance (Fan et al., 2011; Nee & Opper, 2007; Kinghan & Newman, 2015). 
Thus, emerging markets provide a rich setting to explore the role of PCs in a market economy.  
PCs refer to formal and informal ties between firms and political powers: for example, 
the equity ownership of the state or managerial connections with politicians (Faccio, 2006; 
Inoue et al., 2013; Sun et al., 2015; Deng et al., 2018). In other words, some PCs are naturally 
obtained or ascribed but some others are acquired instrumently. Firms with ascribed PCs are 
fundamentally different with those with acquired PCs (Deng et al., 2018). Ascribed PCs are 
defined as connections which the firms naturally get; however, acquired PCs are the ones the 
firms need to create or develop via managerial-based political ties. 
The benefits of firms with ascribed PCs come from strong relationships with the 
government via state ownership of their equity (Duanmu, 2014; Xia et al., 2014). Li et al. 
(2014) show that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) receive strong assistance from the 
government when they run their business in their home country. While SOEs are known as 
firm with equity-based political ties, non-SOEs can also develop the connections with 
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politicians for opportunistic purposes via managerial-based political ties, which are called 
acquired PCs. However, acquired PCs are more fragile than ascribed PCs when firms with 
acquired PCs always need to seek or maintain their PCs, but SOEs with natural PCs do not. 
However, while bringing many benefits, PCs can also come with costs for the firm when the 
politically connected managers are rent-seeking, as explained by agency theory (Nguyen & van 
Dijk, 2012). Firms with PCs always need to make informal payments for the benefits they get. 
Hence, it has raised the question about if the heterogeneity of political connections leads to a 
difference in firm value among firms with ascribed or acquired PCs and firms without any type 
of PCs. 
It is likely that there is a link between firm’s ownership and their PCs, since both 
ownership and PCs have an impact on the firm’s decision making. The concentration or 
diffusion of firm’s ownership plays an important role in firm’s efficiency. Different with firms 
with concentration in ownership, managers in firms with diffuse ownership have significant 
power at hand; however, their interests do not coincide with those of shareholders. Hence, the 
use of corporate resources does not focus on maximizing the benefits of shareholders, which 
they deserve to get. A strong positive relation between concentrated ownership (CO) and 
corporate performance can be found in developed countries (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; 
McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Zingales, 1994; Claessens & Djankov, 1999) because firms with 
concentration in ownership seem to have better monitoring and result with better performance. 
The results are similar with transition economies where CO has a positive impact on stock price 
or firm performance (Claessens, 1997; Weiss & Nikitin, 1998; Xu & Wang, 1997; Earle & 
Estrin, 1996). Firms with CO may have less probability of an increasing agency cost, which is 
brought by PCs of firms. It can be explained that a lack of concentration in ownership leads to 
agency problems, resulting in inferior performance (Gaur, Bathula, & Singh, 2015). Moreover, 
firms with concentration in ownership may have a stronger focus on getting benefits from their 
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PCs rather than those with diffuse ownership. Therefore, CO plays an important role in the 
impact of PCs on firm efficiency. 
Much of the empirical work on the impacts of PCs has been done with diversification in 
the results (e.g. Li et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2012; Du & Girma, 2010; Sheng et al., 2011; Su & 
Fung, 2013; Wong, 2016; Boubakri et al., 2008; Adhikari et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2014; Ding 
et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2017), or even with a main focus on the impacts of managerial-based 
and equity-based political ties (e. g. Deng et al., 2018). Moreover, the topic of CO and firm 
performance is not a new one (e. g. Chen et al., 2005; Lefort & Urzúa, 2008; Claessens & 
Djankov, 1999; Wang & Shailer, 2013; Altaf & Shah, 2018; Gaur et al., 2015). However, there 
is still a gap in the literature on the multiple impacts of PCs on firm value focusing on the 
heterogeneity of PCs between ascribed and acquired ones, and the previous studies especially 
overlook the moderation effect of CO on the relation between PCs and firm value. Hence, in 
order to address the research gap associated with the heterogeneous effects of PCs as well as 
the moderation influence of CO, the aims of this chapter are therefore to analyze whether (i) 
firms with ascribed PCs have better firm value (FV) than those without any PCs; (ii) firms with 
acquired PCs have higher FV than those without any PCs; (iii) CO plays an important role in 
the impact of acquired PCs on FV and (iv) acquired politically connected firms exhibit higher 
FV than ascribed politically connected firms. In order to do so, we use different sub-samples 
from a unique dataset of 1,365 firm-years based on 273 firms listed on the Hanoi Stock 
Exchange (HNX) and the Ho Chi Minh stock exchange (HOSE) in Vietnam for the period 
2010–2014 to have a pairwise comparison for each of hypothesis. 
We choose Vietnam for several reasons. First, Vietnam shows a typical picture of an 
emerging market (Meyer & Nguyen, 2005). Second, Vietnam is a network-oriented economy 
(Pham & Talavera, 2018), where networks or connections play important roles in doing 
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business (To & Tran, 2005). Third, a very high level of corruption can be found in Vietnam9, 
which is a proof that firms may need to make informal payments for their connections “in order 
to get things done”; therefore, PCs not only bring firm benefits, but also, they bring costs. 
Fourth, with shifting from a centrally planned to a market economy from the economic and 
political reforms under Đổi Mới in 1986, Vietnam has showed remarkable economic 
development and now has become one of the most dynamic emerging countries in East Asia 
region10; hence, the study can be seen as one of the most important references in order to build 
up a better environment for economic development. 
Our mostly empirical contribution to the literature is in four aspects. First, the study 
provides new insights into PCs by figuring out the heterogeneous impacts of PCs on FV by 
using two perspectives of PCs including ascribed and acquired PCs and considering the 
importance of ownership structure in the impact of PCs on FV. Second, related to agency 
theory, we find that a higher FV is not exhibited from PCs because of the increasing agency 
cost; but in the case of firms with CO, acquired PCs can exhibit some benefit. This also sheds 
the light on the literature about the link between ownership structure and PCs in emerging 
markets. Third, we introduce the new and clearer measure of PCs, which is easier and more 
reliable to collect in an emerging market like Vietnam. Fourth, we add a country study for 
Vietnam to the emerging literature on the relationships of PCs, CO and FV. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section two shows the literature review and hypotheses 
development. Section three introduces data and models. Section four presents the analysis 
results. Section five gives some discussions and conclusion.  
                                                       
9 Vietnam is ranked 112 out of 168 countries in the 2015 Global Corruption Report. The score equals 31 in the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which ranges between 100 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). The 
information is available at http://www.transparency.org/country#VNM 
10 Available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/vietnam/overview 
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2.2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
Previous studies suggest several benefits of PCs for firms, including access to privileged 
financing sources, subsidies or the use of contacts and knowledge to obtain favors when 
developing new regulations or participating in contracts with government authorities (Agrawal 
& Knoeber, 2001; Pérez et al., 2015). Besides that, Faccio (2006) argues that political 
relationships can help firms to exploit weaknesses in their institutional environment and lead 
to preferential government treatments such as, for instance, easier access to bank financing, 
lower tax rates, more contracts with the government and less strict regulatory supervision. 
Boubakri et al. (2008) show that politically connected firms have less budget constraints and 
are less exposed to competition than firms without PCs. Moreover, firms with PCs can easier 
attract investments. Duchin and Sosyura (2012) conclude that politically connected firms 
receive more public investment than firms without. Summing up, the benefits of PCs can lead 
to superior performance and increase the FV of politically connected firms (Hillman, 2005). 
This is especially relevant in an emerging economic setting with high corruption and weak rule 
of law enforcement, since PCs may result rent-seeking behaviour of politically connected 
shareholders and/or managers (Muttakin et al., 2015). 
In emerging markets, politically connected firms can be recognized by equity 
shareholding and managerial ties (Inoue et al., 2013; Sun et al., 2015; Deng et al., 2018). From 
the perspective of equity shareholding, the state owns more than 50% of the firm’s total shares 
can be seen as a strong proof for the connection between firm itself and political powers. 
Besides, the representatives of state ownership in SOEs are also known as politicians who have 
close relationships with governmental authorities (Nguyen, 2006). Hence, this strong 
connection grants firms many benefits. With the perspective of managerial relationships, 
managers of the firms may actively seek the connections with politicians. With political 
networks acquired in various ways, firms can get many benefits even with informal payments 
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(Nguyen & van Dijk, 2012). To sum up, firms may have their PCs by two types: managerial-
based political ties as acquired PCs or equity-based ones as ascribed PCs. 
Ascribed PCs are known as the natural political ties, which SOEs have via state-
ownership in firm’s equity. Because of the strong relationship between SOEs and the 
government, the firms of course receive many advantages from the government. However, it 
can be found that there is the lack of efficiency of SOEs (Boubakri et al., 2008). The 
inefficiency in acquired politically connected firms can be explained by several reasons. First, 
the political view of SOEs posits that the high political interference in the decision-making 
process of these firms distorts the objectives defined for managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). 
It can be known that SOE’s managers seek to maximize their own benefits or ensure success 
in elections, and a long tenure in power rather than maximizing profit or value of firms. Second, 
a lack of outside monitoring makes firms with ascribed PCs inefficient (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Grossman & Hart, 1983; Nguyen & van Dijk, 2012). Laffont and Tirole (1993) also 
believe that the inefficiency of SOEs is because the managers of those firms are not adequately 
monitored, as there is no individual owner with the necessary incentives to do this. Moreover, 
natural PCs of SOEs are also the means, which the government and affiliated politicians use to 
extract the benefits at the expense of wealth maximization for the benefit of other stakeholders 
in the firm (Boubakri et al., 2008).  
Vietnam is characterized by a high share of SOEs. SOEs in Vietnam are defined as the 
firms in which the government owns an effective controlling interest, with the objectives of 
helping the government in shouldering a number of social responsibilities, operating for the 
benefit of society coping with market failures. This leads to the fact that SOEs are not oriented 
towards and do not try to maximize profits like private companies. Therefore, SOEs in Vietnam 
are always put under the political system (Nguyen, 2003) and enjoy many priorities in 
government investments, using 60% of national capital resources (Nguyen, 2006). The leaders 
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of Vietnamese SOEs are the representatives of state’s capital in the firms and known as 
politicians or the ones who have strong connections with politicians. Therefore, with strong 
connections with political power, SOEs can achieve many benefits and advantages, which they 
cannot obtain if they were privately owned. The literature suggests that SOEs are likely to have 
competitive advantages in form of preferential treatments, and this mainly occurs in economies 
with weak institutions and legal regimes, thus typically in emerging markets like Vietnam. The 
benefits that SOEs obtain include preferential access to credit, regulatory protection or 
government aid to financially distressed firms. But from this reason, SOEs often need to make 
informal payments to maintain their political connections, which bring to them many benefits 
(Nguyen & Van Dijk, 2012). Therefore, corruption is mainly a big problem in SOEs. 
Vietnamese SOEs, besides having many benefits, also have many problems and costs, 
which all are created from their acquired PCs. We, therefore, hypothesize that the following: 
 
H1: Firms with ascribed PCs have lower firm value than firms without any PCs. 
 
Vietnam is a network-oriented economy (Pham & Talavera, 2018) and firms always do 
business easier with better networking. However, in a country with a very high level of 
corruption like Vietnam11, firms always need to pay in order to maintain their PCs (or even 
create a new one). It is usual that informal payments need to be made by the firms who “want 
to get things done”. In this case, if the benefits from connections are higher than the costs, firms 
with PCs may have a higher firm value than those without PCs. However, the CEO of the firm 
may first think about his/her benefits rather than of the right of shareholders. This is the case 
                                                       
11 Vietnam scored 31 in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which ranges between 100 (highly clean) and 0 
(highly corrupt). The information is available at http://www.transparency.org/country#VNM 
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especially in Vietnam being a country with a weak corporate governance framework resulting 
in low shareholder influence (Bertrand et al., 2018). Therefore, acquired PCs come with both 
benefits and costs. In terms of a “helping hand”, a number of studies have found that acquired 
PCs can help firms to gain a number of benefits (Chen et al., 2017) including benefits from 
soft-budget constraints, a lower risk of liquidity constraints, benefits from tax policy, stronger 
market power, receiving government contracts or even more relaxed regulations. It can be 
recognized that a number of papers have shown that firms can gain many advantages from their 
close relationships with political power. It suggests that politicians often use their political 
power to give economic favors to the firms, which whom they have strong connections (see 
Fisman, 2001; Johnson & Mitton, 2003; Faccio et al., 2005; Sapienza, 2004; Amore & 
Bennedsen, 2013; Adelino & Dinc¸, 2014; Schoenherr, 2018). However, in this case, 
politicians prefer private ownership rather than shareholding ownership because they can seek 
rent or extract more resources from private shareholders using bribes or excess employment 
(Chen et al., 2017). In contrast, in terms of a “grabbing hand”, PCs can harm firm efficiency if 
the officials exert political pressure to engage in rent-seeking behaviors. Besides that, firms 
with acquired PCs may need to deal with the agency problem because politically connected 
members of the board of directors try to keep the firm’s internal governance structure weak 
and lower its performance (Muttakin et al., 2015). Moreover, Boubakri et al. (2008) report that 
the managers of firms with acquired PCs lack incentives to maximize shareholder wealth or 
improve operating profit. Furthermore, firms always need to make informal payments to 
maintain their connections with political power. In other words, preferences that firms get also 
come with costs.  
In an emerging market like Vietnam, acquired PC firms always need to make informal 
payments to maintain their connections with politicians, together with agency cost creating 
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from the problem of information asymmetry. The costs in which firms need to bear seem higher 
than the benefits firms get; hence, we hypothesize the following: 
 
H2a: Firms with acquired PCs have lower firm value than those without any PCs. 
 
Even acquired PCs can have negative effects on firm value since acquired PCs may come 
to firms with costs, but we still think that firms can benefit from their acquired PCs with the 
belief that CO can help. Different that diffuse ownership, firms with CO can have less 
probability of facing agency problems; besides, CO can help acquired PC firms to concentrate 
on maximizing the benefits from PCs in comparison with cost. Furthermore, firms with 
concentration in ownership seem to have better monitoring and results with better performance 
since firms can focus easier on the goals of maximizing profit. Therefore, the following can be 
hypothesized: 
 
H2b: Acquired politically connected firms with CO have higher firm value than those with 
diffuse ownership and firms without any PCs. 
 
Although both ascribed and acquired PCs bring firms with disadvantages since all types 
of PCs are hypothesized to have negative effects on firm value, except acquired politically 
connected firms with CO, firms with acquired PCs are hypothesized to have higher firm value 
than those with ascribed PCs. It can be explained that firms with ascribed PCs are usually 
bureaucratic, inefficient and incapable of maximizing profit (Williamson & Raman, 2011; 
Deng et al., 2018). Vietnamese SOE managers have weaker motives to pursue profit and 
efficiency than those in private-owned firms (Ramstetter and Phan, 2013). First, SOEs are often 
expected to be relatively inefficient compared to other firms. The Vietnamese government has 
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often put SOEs in a competitively lacking environment that weakens the pressure on the SOEs 
to run the firm efficiently. The second reason of the weak motives of SOE managers is salaries 
or bonuses. The managers of SOEs are the representatives of a state’s share in firms, and they 
manage the firms as their jobs and all they receive is a low salary that is paid by the government; 
therefore, firms’ profit or loss does not have much influence on them. In contrast, firms with 
acquired PCs, particularly the managers of those firms, have interdependence with the state, 
which helps firms have more efficient monitoring and management, resulting in better 
performance. So, the hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H3: Firms with acquired PCs have higher firm value than those with ascribed PCs. 
 
2.3 Data and models 
2.3.1 Data  
Our data set covers the financial and non-financial information of the Vietnamese listed 
firms on the two main stock exchanges in Vietnam including Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) 
and Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE). The financial information is provided by HNX and 
HOSE. We eliminate all financial firms from the sample and start with 510 non-financial firms 
listed in both stock exchanges in 2010. We exclude firms that do not have financial information 
and firms that stop being listed in stock exchanges during the period from 2010 to 2014. In 
total, we remove 237 firms including 162 firms listed in Hanoi stock exchange and 142 firms 
listed in Ho Chi Minh City stock exchange and finalize with a sample of 273 firms from 2010 
to 2014 including 131 firms listed in Hanoi stock exchange and 142 firms listed in Ho Chi 
Minh City stock exchange. After that, we manually collect the non-financial information from 
annual reports and firms’ websites. The data sample is strongly balanced panel data and 
incorporates the period from 2010 to 2014 with 1,365 observations of 273 firms.  
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2.3.2 Models 
We use different sub-samples for different models to have pairwise comparisons. We 
first examine the link between ascribed PCs and FV with the hypothesis that firms with ascribed 
PCs have lower FV than firm without any PCs. By using the sub-sample of firms with acquired 
PCs and firms without any PCs, the regression equation is specified as follows: 
 
(1) VALUEit = α + β ASCRIBEDPCSit + Σ ϒ CONTROLSit + εit 
 
We use firm growth (FGROWTH), leverage (LEV), firm size (FSIZE), board size 
(BSIZE) and duality (DUAL) to control for factors that potentially affect FV in this model. 
The sub-sample of firms with acquired PCs and firms without any PCs is used to test the 
effects of acquired PCs on FV with the following regression equation: 
 
(2) VALUEit = α + β ACQUIREDPCSit + Σ ϒ CONTROLSit + εit 
 
We continue to use firm growth (FGROWTH), leverage (LEV), firm size (FSIZE), board 
size (BSIZE), duality (DUAL) and CO to control for factors that potentially affect firm value 
(VALUE) in this model. 
Moreover, we believe that the impact of acquired PCs is heterogeneous by the CO; hence, 
we further explore the importance of CO on the impact of PCs and FV. To do so, we use the 
sub-sample of firms with acquired PCs to test whether in acquired politically connected firms, 
those with concentrated ownership can have better firm value than others.  
 
(3a) VALUEit = α + β COit + Σ ϒ CONTROLSit + εit 
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We continue to use a sub-sample of firms with acquired PCs and firms without any PCs 
to examine whether acquired politically connected firms with CO have better firm value than 
others with the following regression equation: 
 
(3b) VALUEit = α + β1 ACQUIREDPCSit + β2 COit + β3 ACQUIREDPCSit* COit + ϒ 
CONTROLSit + εit 
 
Regression equation (4) is used to test whether firms with acquired PCs have higher FV 
than those with acquired PCs, because firms with ascribed PCs are usually known to be strongly 
bureaucratic and inefficient in performance. In comparison with firms with ascribed PCs, those 
with acquired PCs have the interdependence with the state, which can help those firms get 
preferential treatment from political powers without the strong bureaucracy in running 
business. We formulate the model as the same with model (1), but we just focus on the sub-
sample of firms with PCs only: 
 
(4) VALUEit = α + β ACQUIREDPCSit + Σ ϒ CONTROLSit + εit 
 
In all equations, subscripts i and t present for firm and time. VALUE is the market 
valuation indicator. The two stock market valuation measures used to proxy for VALUE are 
Tobin’s Q (Q) and the market-to-book ratio (MTB). 
We confined firms with ascribed PCs to SOEs. We list a firm as SOE if the state owns 
more than 50% of the total shares. ASCRIBEDPCS equals 1 if the firm is state-controlled and 
0 otherwise. For acquired politically connected firms, we recognize those firms based on 
comparing the information of the firm and the top politicians of Vietnam. We regard that the 
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firm is with acquired PCs when the firm is a private-owned enterprise and meets one of the 
following conditions: 
(1) CEO or chairman of the board have the same native hometown with one of the top 
politicians of Vietnam and the firm itself has headquarters or a representative office in Hanoi 
or Ho Chi Minh City. 
(2) One of the members of the manager board of directors is/was a member of Parliament 
or Provincial People’s Council. 
(3) the firm is a former SOE. 
(4) CEO or chairman of the board is a former government official/ bureaucrat. 
We think that if the CEO or chairman of the firm has the same native hometown (at the 
district level) and the firm itself has headquarters or a representative office in the two biggest 
cities in Vietnam including Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh City, it can be easy to get the connections 
with politicians via the activities of the fellow-countrymen association (usually known under 
the name “Hội đồng hương”), where the top politicians are also members. The reason of 
focusing on just two biggest cities is because most of the activities of the top politicians happen 
in those cities; hence, it is easier for firms to get the connections. We do not focus on the 
measure of ACQUIREDPCS based on the membership of the Communist Party of Vietnam 
because the information of the management and director board that is available in annual 
reports or other official channels of the firms do not disclose such membership. 
We define the firms with CO when the top 5 shareholders own more than 20% the total 
share of the firm. We consider 20% because it is the minimum percentage of a firm’s equity 
considered as a controlling interest (La Porta et al., 1999). We use firm growth (FGROWTH), 
leverage (LEV), firm size (FSIZE), board size (BSIZE) and duality (DUAL) to control for 
factors that potentially affect firm value (VALUE). Firm growth (FGROWTH) is measured by 
the growth speed (percentage) of total assets (Nguyen & Van Dijk, 2012); Firm size (FSIZE) 
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is the natural logarithm of book value of total assets (Cheng, 2008; Liu et al., 2015; Harjoto et 
al., 2015; Kabir & Thai, 2017); Leverage (LEV) is measured as total debt over total assets 
(Phan, 2018; Le et al., 2014; Nguyen et al., 2018); Board size (BSIZE) is the natural logarithm 
of the total number of directors (Kabir & Thai, 2017); Duality (DUAL) is a dummy variable 
of whether or not the CEO of the firm is also the chairman of the board (Doğan, 2013; Le et 
al., 2014). Firms with larger firm size or higher growth tend to have lower growth opportunities, 
leading to lower firm value (Konijn et al., 2011). Based on Yermack (1996), from the 
perspective of agency theory, smaller boards are more effective and thus have a positive 
contribution to firm value. However, resource dependence theory suggests that a larger board 
size can help to increase corporate performance and firm value (Dalton et al., 1999). Hence, 
the empirical evidence about the effect of the board size on firm value is mixed. The effect of 
leverage is also mixed. Higher leverage means higher agency costs and diverging interests 
across managers, shareholders, and debtholders. This causes a negative link between leverage 
and firm value (Le et al., 2014). However, leverage is also known as an important role in 
boosting corporate value (Nguyen et al., 2018) because of the benefit of a tax shield (Miller & 
Modigliani, 1963). In case of duality, the CEO of the firm may exert his/her own authority 
during decision making process and the board of directors or even the chairman himself may 
not be able to assess the CEO’s duties in an effective way, which consequently decreases the 
firm value (Doğan, 2013).  The definitions of all variables are shown in the table 2.1. 
 
[Insert Table 2.1 here] 
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2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
The panel A of table 2.2 shows the description of the variables employed in the analysis. 
We winsorize all continuous variables at 5% level. It presents that more than 52% (720 firm-
year observations) of the sample have connections with political powers, including 15% are 
with ascribed and 37% with acquired PCs. The description about observations with ascribed 
and acquired PCs is shown in detail in the panel B of table 2.2. With regard to firm value, we 
find that the average of MTB is 0.83. The literature reports values of 0.92 (Nguyen et al., 2018), 
0.83 (Nguyen et al., 2015), 0.87 (Phan, 2018), 0.77 (Connelly et al., 2017). The average Q is 
0.65, while Nguyen et al. (2108) reports a value of 0.69. The average BSIZE of the firms in the 
sample is about 5 members. This is similar to the results found by Kabir and Thai (2017) and 
Le et al. (2014). The mean value of LEV is 0.5, similar to values from the literature (0.53 by 
Kabir & Thai, 2017, 0.51 by Nhung & Okuda, 2015, and 0.5 by Phan, 2018). 
 
[Insert Table 2.2 here] 
 
The correlations among variables are shown in Table 2.3. The results from this table 
indicate that all correlation coefficients between independent variables are lower than 0.5, so 
there is no serious multi-collinearity (Xia et al., 2014; Sun at al., 2016; Deng et al., 2018). MTB 
is highly correlated with Q (0.91). All types of PCs including ASCRIBED and ACQUIRED 
PCs are significantly positively correlated with MTB and Q. Among control variables, LEV 
and BSIZE are significantly positive correlated while DUAL and FSIZE are significantly 
negative correlated with both MTB and Q.  
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[Insert Table 2.3 here] 
 
2.4.2 Regression results 
As the data used contains a panel component, problems can occur with regard to cross-
sectional characteristics as heteroscedasticity or time-series characteristics as autocorrelation 
and omitted variables. With those problems, fixed effects model and random effects model are 
the most usually estimations to address. In case of a balanced panel data, fixed effects model 
is preferred (Kabir & Thai, 2017). Yet, we take a robustness check for panel regression 
estimations. Accordingly, the Hausman test is used to test whether fixed or random effects 
model is chosen and the results indicate that the fixed effects model is more suitable. We 
continue to use F test to choose between OLS and fixed effects model.  The test shows that 
fixed effects model is the most suitable one. The table 2.4 presents the regression results of 
fixed effects model. We divide the sample into different sub-samples to have different pairwise 
comparisons. The table comprises five panels: Panels A for regression results to test whether 
ascribed PC firms have lower firm value than non-PC firms; panel B for regression results to 
test whether acquired PC firms have lower firm value than non-PC firms; panel C for regression 
results to test whether acquired PC firms with concentrated ownership have higher firm value 
than those with diffuse ownership; panel D for regression results to test whether acquired PC 
firms with concentrated ownership have higher firm value than those with diffuse ownership 
and non-PC firms; and panel E for regression results to test whether acquired PC firms have 
higher firm value than ascribed PC firms. 
By using the sub-sample of firms with ascribed PCs and firms without any PCs, the panel 
A of table 2.4 shows that the regression coefficients of ASCRIBEDPCS are significantly 
negative in both case of MTB and Q. The negative coefficients of ASCRIBEDPCS indicate 
that SOEs have lower firm value than the companies without any PCs. Among the control 
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variables, the coefficients of FGROWTH, FSIZE and DUAL are significantly negative while 
the coefficient of LEV is significantly positive. The negative coefficients of FGROWTH and 
FSIZE are consistent with the expectation that larger sized firms may have less opportunities 
for improving corporate performance and firm value. The negative coefficient of DUAL is also 
consistent with the idea that duality creates the ineffectiveness in managing the firm which 
translates into a lower firm value (VALUE). The positive coefficient of LEV is in line with the 
expectation that leverage can boost corporate value (Nguyen et al., 2018).    
In the panel B, with sub-sample of firms with acquired PCs and firms without any PCs, 
we find that the coefficients of ACQUIREDPCS are negative significant in both case of MTB 
and Q. This is consistent with our hypothesis that firms with acquired PCs need to make 
informal payment to create or maintain their connections with politicians; besides that, they 
also need to face with agency problems since acquired PCs create information asymmetry, 
which negatively influence on firm value. The panel B also indicates that the regression 
coefficients of FGROWTH and FSIZE are both negative significant and the one of LEV is 
positive significant. The coefficients of BSIZE and DUAL are not significant. 
The panel C is with sub-sample of firms with acquired PCs only to test whether acquired 
PC firms with CO have higher firm value than those with diffuse ownership or not. The 
regression results show that the coefficients of CO are significantly positive in both case of 
MTB and Q. The positive coefficients of CO are consistent with the expectation that CO can 
help firms with acquired PC to avoid the problem of information asymmetry, which translates 
to a higher firm value (VALUE).  
In the panel D, with sub-sample of firms with acquired PCs and firms without any PCs, 
we find that the coefficients of ACQUIREDPCS are significantly negative in both cases of 
MTB and Q, but the coefficients on the interaction term between ACQUIREDPCS and CO 
turn significantly positive. The negative coefficients of ACQUIREDPCS indicate that in firms 
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with acquired PCs have lower firm value (VALUE) than those without any PCs; in contrast, 
the positive coefficients on the interaction term between ACQUIREDPCS and CO shows that 
acquired PC firms with CO exhibit higher firm value (VALUE) than firms without any PCs. 
The results are consistent with our expectation that CO can help firms with acquired PCs to 
avoid the problems of information asymmetry and focus more on maximizing profits firms can 
get from their PCs. 
The final panel of table 2.4 is with the sub-sample of firms with ascribed and acquired 
PCs. Regarding to our variable of interest, our hypothesis that firms with acquired PCs have 
higher firm value than those with ascribed PCs is confirmed. The regression coefficients of 
ACQUIREDPCS are significantly positive in both cases of MTB and Q. The positive 
coefficients of ACQUIREDPCS indicate that in comparison with firms with acquired PCs, 
Vietnamese SOEs performs ineffectively, even they receive many benefits from their close 
relationship with the Government.  
 
[Insert Table 2.4 here] 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Our results show that SOEs, known as ascribed politically connected firms, have lower 
FV than firms without any types of PCs. Besides, firms with acquired PCs have lower FV than 
non-politically connected firms. It can be explained with the argument that in emerging 
economies where there is a weak rule of law, weak regulatory environment, poor investor 
protection and high level of corruption, the business elites potentially exploit their political 
linkages to influence the system in accumulating their own wealth at the expense of general 
shareholders (Li et al., 2008; Mutakin et al., 2015). Hence, politically connected firms in any 
cases, especially acquired politically connected firms, have to make or bear the informal 
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payments or the informal cost of creating connections with politicians. Moreover, SOEs in 
emerging economies, especially in Vietnam, are always put under the political system 
(Nguyen, 2003) and enjoy many priorities (Nguyen, 2006) but they always claim a 
disproportionate share of national investment in land, property and physical assets with a less 
than proportionate increase in enterprise performance (Minor et al., 2017); so far this causes 
the low firm effectiveness. The political and bureaucratic interference and ownership has made 
SOE’s control and monitor systems for political interest other than effectiveness; that is the 
reason why SOEs, which are known as firms with ascribed PCs, have weaker motives to pursue 
profit and efficiency than those in privately-owned firms. 
As discussed, informal expenses can rise in acquired politically connected firms, but it 
cannot be disclaimed that with PCs firms can receive many benefits from the political powers. 
In the case that firms can lower the costs brought from PCs and maximize the benefit, which 
they can get from their PCs, firms can get the advantages. We find that with concentrated 
ownership, acquired politically connected firms can have better FV than those with diffuse 
ownership and also firms without any PCs. It can be explained that in firms with diffuse 
ownership, acquired PCs can cause an increase in agency problems along with agency cost 
because of the problem of information asymmetry; but in contrast, acquired politically 
connected firms with CO can avoid the increase of agency problem. Moreover, CO can help 
acquired politically connected firms focusing more on maximizing profits or advantages they 
get from their PCs. In the developed markets, a strong institutional setting and strong corporate 
governance may help shareholders in monitoring the PCs; but in emerging economies, with the 
absence of a strong institutional environment and strong corporate governance, political agents 
may engage in wealth expropriation at the expense of other shareholders, especially minority 
shareholders. 
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This study offers important practical implications for managers in Vietnam in building 
or using their own PCs. Previous studies indicate that PCs bring to the firms many benefits and 
advantages, including preferential access to credit, regulatory protection or government aid to 
financially distressed firms (Faccio et al., 2006; Fan et al., 2007; Gul, 2006; Li et al., 2008); 
however, our empirical results show that PCs are not always completely positive. Muttakin et 
al. (2015) also show that PCs can harm firm performance in non-family firms since the agency 
problem also comes with PCs. It also gives the implications for Vietnamese Government in 
building a strong institutional setting as well as strong corporate governance regulations in 
order to have better environments for firms. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 2.1 Variable definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
MTB Market to book value. Measured by Market Capitalization divided by book value of 
total assets. 
Q Tobin's Q. Measured by market value of equity divided by book value of equity. 
ASCRIBEDPCS Ascribed Political Connections 
A binary variable which equals one if the firm is a SOE and zero otherwise. 
ACQUIREDPCS Acquired Political Connections 
A binary variable, equals one if the firm is acquired political connected and zero 
otherwise. 
FGROWTH Asset Growth rate 
LEV Measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
FSIZE Measured by natural logarithm of book value of total assets. 
BSIZE Measured by natural logarithm of the total number of director 
DUAL A binary variable which equals one if the chairman of the firm is also the CEO and 
zero otherwise. 
CO Concentrated ownership 
A binary variable, equals one if the firm is the one with concentrated ownership and 
zero otherwise. 
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Table 2.2 Variable description 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
MTB 0.83 0.13 0.55 2.77 
Q 0.65 0.14 0.37 2.02 
ASCRIBEDPCS 0.15 0.36 0 1 
ACQUIREDPCS 0.37 0.48 0 1 
FGROWTH 0.13 0.23 -0.18 0.71 
LEV 0.50 0.20 0.13 0.81 
FSIZE 1227.70 1730.98 40.94 6637.75 
BSIZE 4.60 0.81 5 7 
DUAL 0.35 0.48 0 1 
OC 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Notes: 
For variable definitions: see Table 2.1. 
FSIZE is measured by the book value of total assets. 
BSIZE is measured by the total number of director. 
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Panel B. Firm-year observations with PCs over years 
 
Year Ascribed PCs Acquired PCs Total 
2010 60 52 112 
2011 59 56 115 
2012 42 84 126 
2013 28 155 183 
2014 20 164 184 
Total 209 511 720 
 
 
 
  
 90 
Table 2.3 Correlation coefficients 
 
   Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 MTB 1          
2 Q 0.91 
*** 
1         
3 ASCRIBEDPCS -0.09 
*** 
-0.12 
*** 
1        
4 ACQUIREDPCS -0.07 
*** 
-0.07 
** 
-0.33 
*** 
1       
5 FGROWTH -0.02 -0.06 
** 
0.02 -0.12 
*** 
1      
6 LEV 0.46 
*** 
0.30 
*** 
-0.02 -0.09 
*** 
0.18 
*** 
1     
7 FSIZE -0.06 
** 
-0.09 
*** 
-0.05 
* 
-0.12 
*** 
0.16 
*** 
0.34 
*** 
1    
8 BSIZE 0.23 
*** 
0.21 
*** 
0.11 
*** 
-0.03 0.06 
** 
0.17 
*** 
0.02 1   
9 DUAL -0.17 
*** 
-0.12 
*** 
0.13 
*** 
0.06 
** 
-0.07 
** 
-0.33 
*** 
-0.11 
*** 
-0.06 
** 
1  
10 OC -0.06 
*** 
-0.04 0.37 
*** 
-0.07 
*** 
0.00 -0.03 0.10 
*** 
0.17 
*** 
0.10 
*** 
1 
Notes:  
For variable definitions: see Table 2.1. 
*, **, *** for statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 5% level. 
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Table 2.4 Estimation Results: Political connections and firm value 
 
Panel A. Ascribed PC and non-PC firms 
Sample Ascribed PC and non-PC firms 
Model # (1)   (2) 
D. V. MTB  Q 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
ASCRIBEDPCS -0.0298** 0.023  -0.0594*** 0.001 
FGROWTH -0.0181** 0.038  -0.0335*** 0.004 
LEV 0.3327*** 0.000  0.2799*** 0.000 
FSIZE -0.0326*** 0.001  -0.0276** 0.029 
BSIZE 0.0161 0.250  0.0207 0.267 
DUAL -0.0082* 0.078  -0.0117* 0.061 
Constant 0.8613*** 0.000  0.6776*** 0.000 
Stock exchange controls No  No 
Industry controls No  No 
Year controls Yes  Yes 
R squared 0.3011  0.1811 
F 25.72  13.21 
Prob>F 0.000  0.000 
N 854  854 
Notes:  
For variable definitions: see Table 1. 
*, **, *** for statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 5% level. 
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Panel B. Acquired PC and non-PC firms 
 
Sample Acquired PC and non-PC firms 
Model # (3)   (4) 
D. V. MTB  Tobin’s Q 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
ACQUIREDPCS -0.0121*** 0.002  -0.0218*** 0.000 
FGROWTH -0.0184** 0.011  -0.0383*** 0.000 
LEV 0.3216*** 0.000  0.2510*** 0.000 
FSIZE -0.0291*** 0.000  -0.0337*** 0.001 
BSIZE 0.0177 0.127  0.0063 0.706 
DUALITY -0.0025 0.483  -0.0016 0.753 
CO 0.0085** 0.026  0.0217*** 0.000 
Constant 0.8262*** 0.000  0.7209*** 0.000 
Stock exchange controls No  No 
Industry controls No  No 
Year controls Yes  Yes 
R Squared 0.2859  0.1479 
F 32.47  14.07 
Prob>F 0.000  0.000 
N 1156  1156 
 Notes:  
For variable definitions: see Table 1. 
*, **, *** for statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 5% level. 
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Panel C. Acquired PC firms 
 
Sample Acquired PC firms 
Model # (5)   (6) 
D. V. MTB  Tobin’s Q 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
CO 0.0496*** 0.000  0.0892*** 0.000 
FGROWTH -0.0025 0.813  -0.0203 0.210 
LEV 0.3611*** 0.000  0.1777*** 0.000 
FSIZE -0.0395*** 0.002  -0.0715*** 0.000 
BSIZE -0.0158 0.397  -0.0079 0.780 
DUAL -0.0013 0.835  0.0007 0.942 
Constant 0.8746*** 0.000  0.9167*** 0.000 
Stock exchange controls No  No 
Industry controls No  No 
Year controls Yes  Yes 
R Squared 0.4405  0.2963 
F 23.93  12.80 
Prob>F 0.000  0.000 
N 511  511 
Notes:  
For variable definitions: see Table 1. 
*, **, *** for statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 5% level. 
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Panel D. Acquired PCs and CO 
 
Sample Acquired PC and non-PC firms 
Model # (7)   (8) 
D. V. MTB  Tobin’s Q 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
ACQUIREDPCS -0.0454*** 0.000  -0.0705*** 0.000 
FGROWTH -0.0224*** 0.007  -0.0306** 0.011 
LEV 0.2902*** 0.000  0.1966*** 0.000 
FSIZE -0.0303*** 0.000  -0.0372*** 0.000 
BSIZE 0.0050 0.722  -0.0036 0.860 
DUAL 0.0013 0.754  -0.0013 0.831 
CO -0.0349 0.296  -0.0615 0.201 
ACQUIREDPCS*CO 0.0752*** 0.000  0.1072*** 0.000 
FGROWTH*CO 0.0152 0.197  -0.0068 0.688 
LEV*CO -0.0258 0.145  -0.0003 0.990 
FSIZE*CO -0.0022 0.399  0.0012 0.755 
BSIZE*CO 0.0296 0.131  0.0227 0.421 
DUAL*CO -0.0130** 0.036  -0.0037 0.685 
Constant 0.8797*** 0.000  0.8017*** 0.000 
Stock exchange controls No  No 
Industry controls No  No 
Year controls Yes  Yes 
R Squared 0.3723  0.2425 
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Panel D (cont’d) 
 
    
F 30.92  16.68 
Prob>F 0.000  0.000 
N 1156   1156 
 Notes:  
For variable definitions: see Table 1. 
*, **, *** for statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 5% level. 
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Panel E. Ascribed and acquired PC firms 
 
Sample Ascribed and acquired PC firms 
Model # (9)   (10) 
D. V. MTB  Tobin’s Q 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
ACQUIREDPCS 0.0154** 0.040  0.0204* 0.056 
FGROWTH -0.0109 0.269  -0.0239* 0.090 
LEV 0.3753*** 0.000  0.3004*** 0.000 
FSIZE -0.0248** 0.023  -0.0458*** 0.003 
BSIZE -0.0106 0.539  -0.0132 0.593 
DUAL 0.0033 0.559  0.0074 0.353 
Constant 0.7789*** 0.000  0.7350*** 0.000 
Stock exchange controls No  No 
Industry controls No  No 
Year controls Yes  Yes 
R Squared 0.3136  0.1800 
F 22.39  10.76 
Prob>F 0.000  0.000 
N 720   720 
Notes:  
For variable definitions: see Table 1. 
*, **, *** for statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 5% level. 
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CHAPTER 3  
SOCIAL CAPITAL, CREDIT CHOICES AND GROWTH IN 
VIETNAMESE HOUSEHOLD BUSINESSES12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                       
12 This chapter is a joint work with Michael Frömmel (UGent). 
Financial support from VIED is gratefully acknowledged. We gratefully acknowledge helpful comments and 
suggestions from participants at the 2018 British Accounting and Finance Association (BAFA) Annual 
Conference in London, the 2018 Vietnam International Conference in Finance (VICIF). We are grateful to the 
Institute of Labor Studies and Social Affairs (ILSSA) in the Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs 
(MOLISA), Vietnam and Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark for providing their 
survey data. 
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ABSTRACT 
The study provides the impact of social capital on credit choices and growth of household 
businesses in Vietnam by using a data sample of 3,813 observations. Social capital is 
considered at different levels: micro for human capital and macro for social networks. It 
concludes that while both levels of social capital influence credit choices of household 
businesses, the micro level of social capital plays an important role in improving the household 
business’s growth, including asset growth and income growth. The study develops a broader 
view about the use of resources and financing choices in household businesses in Vietnam. 
Accordingly, it highlights the importance of social capital from multiple aspects - the 
household business itself, human capital, social networks and government - on the development 
of Vietnamese household businesses. 
Keywords: social capital; human capital; social networks; credit choices; household business. 
JEL classification: H31, J24, L25, L14, O53. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The topic of social capital and firm performance is no longer a new one, but the authors 
usually focus on the effect of human capital singly (Cooper et al., 1994; Van Praag & Cramer, 
2001) or social networks alone (Yoon, 1991; Aldrich & Reese, 1993; Bates, 1994; Pennings et 
al., 1998) rather than combining them in one study. Moreover, many authors have shed light 
on the relationship between social capital and access to finance, indicating that better social 
capital may partially help firms relax their financial constraints (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006; Le, 
Venkatesh, & Nguyen, 2006; Talavera, Xiong, & Xiong, 2012; Pham & Talavera, 2018). 
However, they do not focus on the credit choices and firms choosing between formal or 
informal loans. Besides, most of the studies concentrate on the small, medium or large-sized 
enterprises, studying micro-enterprises like household businesses is still a gap in literature in 
this field.  
The study aims to bridge the gaps by investigating the impact of social capital on credit 
choices and growth of household businesses. We focus on Vietnamese household businesses 
for several reasons. First, although human capital and social networks have been embraced 
with enthusiasm in recent development literature, until now they have not been widely studied 
considering the development and socioeconomic changes in Vietnam, especially with a focus 
on household businesses. Second, according to the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys for 
Vietnam (World Bank, 2015), access to finance is one of the top business obstacles for firms. 
Hence, with better social networks, firms are more likely to have access to financial resources 
especially for informal loans. For this reason, we think that social networks can affect a firm’s 
credit choices. Third, Vietnam is a network-oriented economy (Pham & Talavera, 2018) where 
social capital plays an important role in running a business (Meyer & Nguyen, 2005). Fourth, 
social capital is becoming increasingly more important in household businesses than in larger-
sized enterprises because household businesses are usually dependent on their relatives, 
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immediate neighbors and friends for credit (as informal loans) and support (Turner & Nguyen, 
2005), or further to improve innovation and share knowledge with the aim of improving profits, 
productivity and their market share (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). Last but not least, 
Vietnamese household businesses are now using two-thirds of the labor force in the whole 
society13 which can help to create more economic value and also contribute socially to the 
sustainable development of the country. Hence, a better understanding about micro-enterprises 
like household businesses is necessary for the Vietnamese government to effectively run the 
country.  
The most important finding in our study is that both levels of social capital can have 
effects on credit choices including informal loan choices and loan choice priority of household 
businesses; but only the micro level of social capital can help firms in improving the economic 
growth of household businesses. Specifically, with a larger household size, better support from 
experienced household members or higher education backgrounds of the owners, obtaining 
informal loans can be an option of external financing when they need financial support. 
Besides, firms with bigger social networks are more likely to get better financial support with 
informal loans. In contrast, household businesses with assistance from business associations 
may get easier access to formal financial sources; therefore, they might not choose informal 
loans. Moreover, household business owners who are members of the Communist Party may 
prefer formal loans since with the membership they will have stronger connections with local 
government officials who can help them access formal financial sources. One of the interesting 
results of this chapter is that while both levels of social capital have effects on credit choices, 
only the micro level which includes the household size, education background and household 
experience impact the household business’s growth in both assets and income.  
                                                       
13 see more at http://www.molisa.gov.vn/vi/pages/ChiTiet.aspx?IDNews=10314 
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 provides 
background about Vietnamese household businesses. Section 4 discusses the methodology. 
Section 5 presents the empirical results, and section 6 summarizes the findings and provides a 
discussion. 
 
3.2 Literature review 
3.2.1 Social capital 
Social capital, originally based on the social capital theory, is multi-dimensional, with 
each dimension contributing to the meaning of social capital, even though each alone is not 
able to fully capture the concept (Hean et al., 2003). Generally, different scholars have defined 
social capital in different ways and identified different groups of dimensions (Claridge, 2004).  
Social capital is characterized by the presence of a certain set of informal values, norms 
and networks fostering cooperation and facilitating collective action (Fukuyama, 1997; Liu & 
Besser, 2003; Woolcock, 2010). It focuses on the resources embedded in one’s social network 
and how access to and use of such resources benefit the individual’s actions (Lin, 2001). 
According to the definition by Woolcock (1998), social capital is the information, trust and 
norms of reciprocity inherent in a social network, where the social network provides the real-
world links between groups or individuals. The central premise of social capital is that social 
networks bring value to individuals.  
Social capital includes the values and benefits resulting from the owner’s interactions 
and networks. According to Putnam (1993), social capital is provided by extended family-
based or community-based relationships. This leads to the fact that participation in social 
networks benefits individuals (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986; Johannisson, 1988). The roles of 
social capital have been documented in different types of networks: networks with government 
officials, networks with banks and other financial institutions, networks with relatives and 
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friends or other business-related networks (Pham & Talavera, 2018). Firms with better social 
capital can be seen as having more social network ties with which the firms’ owner frequently 
has contact (Davidsson & Honig, 2003). Being a member of one or more business associations 
is also evidence of a stronger social embeddedness of the owner and also the firm itself 
(Nguyen & Luu, 2013). Moreover, based on Poon et al. (2012), social capital in entrepreneurs 
can be seen at micro and macro levels. The micro level is seen as the human capital of a 
family/household, and the macro level is the support of social associations for firms. 
Moreover, human capital is assumed to be one of the main drivers of successful firms 
since it increases the capacity of a firm’s owners to plan for future goals, acquire new 
knowledge, skills and other resources; it results in better performance (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990; Barney, 1995; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Brush et al., 2001). The requirements of 
human capital have been increasing, not only in quantity but also quality, with the larger role 
in knowledge intensive activities entailing rapid change (Sonnentag & Frese, 2002; Bosma et 
al., 2004). Generally, firms with a greater human capital endowment tend to have more 
advantages in running and managing their business. For example, they may have some more 
choices in using different resources, get more support or perform more efficiently. 
3.2.2 How does social capital help household businesses? 
Many small and medium enterprises report that financial constraint is one of the major 
difficulties for firms (World Bank, 2016) and they need to seek external capital such as formal 
loans, government financial support or informal credit from different sources (Pham & 
Talavera, 2018). However, access to finance is one of the top business obstacles for firms 
(World bank, 2015). Since the Vietnamese banking sector is heavily regulated, government 
officials at all levels still have considerable influence on banking operations; therefore, 
informal credit is also an option for firms. This is especially true for household businesses since 
such businesses are very small and operation effectiveness is not so high, so accessing formal 
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credit is getting more difficult. Besides formal credit, other informal credit sources widely used 
in Vietnamese household businesses include the following: (1) loans from family and friends, 
(2) loans from private lenders and (3) trade credit from suppliers and customers (Pham & 
Talavera, 2018). Hence, with a larger and better social capital, household businesses tend to 
have informal loans, and they might prefer informal loans over formal loans. 
The role of social capital is known as different types of networks of firms: networks with 
government and financial institutions, business-related networks and networks with family 
members or relatives. Different types of networks can help firms in different ways (Talavera 
& Pham, 2018). For example, through their relationship with government officials, firms can 
easier access formal loans from banks or other state-owned financial institutions with even 
better loan terms (O’Connor, 2000; Tenev et al., 2003; Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006; Le & 
Nguyen, 2009). This can be explained by the considerable power and influence of government 
officials in project approval and resource allocation (Meyer & Nguyen, 2005). Moreover, 
membership in a business association or political party is one way to spread knowledge about 
a firm’s existence, as well as indicate reputation (Coleman, 1988). And this may also help firms 
to increase the probability of accessing credit. For instance, Talavera et al. (2012) have shown 
that in China, membership in the Communist Party can help the firm owner to obtain loans 
from state-owned banks; with membership in business associations, firms have advantages 
when applying for commercial bank loans.  
However, some studies suggest that with better social capital, firms are likely less to rely 
on bank financing or formal loans. It might be the case that with the support of family 
members/relatives or close relationships among firm’s suppliers, and customers, firms can have 
financial support and their need for funding from the formal sector is not so strong. Another 
reason firms prefer informal loans rather than formal ones is the advantage of informal credit. 
Informal loans from family and friends are more convenient, with lower interest rates, longer 
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durations and no collateral or guarantee requirements. In Vietnam, Nguyen et al. (2006) have 
found that informal loans are the principal sources of external financing of many private SMEs. 
Le and Nguyen (2009) state that social networks lead to a reduction in the need and use of 
formal credit. 
Besides informal credit, social capital can help firms to improve their performance. It can 
be explained that firms can rely on their social resources to improve innovation and share 
knowledge with the aim of improving profits, productivity and their market share (Woolcock 
& Narayan, 2000). Poon, Thai and Naybor (2012) conclude that children and male family 
members as family social capital (the micro) contribute to women’s probability of becoming 
entrepreneurs, but institutional social capital (the macro) has the opposite effect. As an 
explanation, since family members are invested in the business, they are more likely to be 
productive, offering loans as well as unpaid time and labor in economic production or even 
share knowledge and professional experience in order to help the owner run the business. 
Children, relatives or a household’s members are important sources of labor for many 
household businesses. They contribute to reducing the costs of running a business by providing 
free labor to the firms. Santarelli and Tran (2013) state that human capital plays an important 
role in firms’ performance. Particularly, professional education, experience and learning 
positively affect a firm’s operating profit. Besides, social networks as customers, business 
partners or other members of business associations can share a firm’s experience, techniques 
or other support in the form of materials, labor and contracts; therefore, this contributes to 
improving firm performance and growth. For instance, network participation and network size 
are important factors that influence operating profit (Santarelli & Tran, 2013). 
The support of a household’s human capital and social networks as social capital is more 
important in household businesses than larger-sized enterprises because of the characteristic of 
this type of business. Santarelli and Tran (2013) mention that the informality of the business 
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environment of young entrepreneurs in Vietnam highlights the role of close interactions with 
family, relatives and friends in stimulating entrepreneurial activities rather the formality of the 
business environment. 
Enterprises depend on multidimensional resources, including capital, labor and materials, 
because they cannot self-supply all their business needs. Hence, they must engage in 
transactions with other enterprises in the market in order to acquire resources. Generally, such 
transactions may be advantageous, but dependencies may also be created. And household 
businesses are not an exception. Social capital brings to the enterprise many benefits, but of 
course there is also the risk of dependencies, as stated by the resource dependence theory 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In the case of household businesses, they can avoid this problem 
with the micro level of social capital but there are still issues on the macro level. Therefore, 
besides the benefit obtained from social networks, household businesses also face risk if they 
have too much dependence on this.  
 
3.3 About Vietnamese household businesses 
Household business is one of the forms of ownership/legal status in Vietnam. Household 
businesses are owned by individuals or families, which produce or distribute goods and 
services for the market. Recently, the development of household businesses in Vietnam has 
recorded a significant growth in volume, making tremendous contributions to job creation and 
service provision for the whole economy. This can be a result of the Doi Moi reform in 1986 
with the liberalization of the economy and adoption of the market economy. Currently, 
household businesses are key players in the Vietnamese economy, generating a total revenue 
of VND 2,249 billion and creating jobs for nearly 8 million people. However, the contribution 
of those enterprises to the state budget is still limited; the total tax contribution accounted for 
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only 2% of the total domestic revenues in 201414. Besides that, even recently, the Vietnamese 
government has tried to help with many supporting programs, but the business environment 
for those type of businesses still has many obstacles. Resultingly, these businesses do not want 
to transform to other types of larger-sized enterprises which have better economic contribution 
to the development of the whole country. 
In a World Bank (2016) report, it is reported that enterprises in Vietnam have to face 
financial constraints as one of the major difficulties, especially the smaller-sized enterprises 
since it is more difficult for them to access formal financial resources. The Vietnamese banking 
sector is heavily regulated, and government officials at all levels still have considerable 
influence on banking operations (Pham & Talavera, 2018). Although the Vietnamese 
government has provided financial support programs, which are channeled through the 
networks of the Social Policy Bank and Vietnam Development Bank, those programs do not 
seem efficient enough, especially for household businesses. All types of businesses usually use 
their own close ties with the local government to obtain formal loans from commercial banks 
or government financial support programs. Therefore, household businesses, micro, small and 
medium-sized enterprises then also usually seek other sources which are widely used, including 
informal loans from friends and relatives, informal loans from their business networks or even 
trade credit from suppliers or customers. However, in household businesses, the level of 
accessing different sources may strongly depend on the owner including the size of the owner’s 
household, business networks of the firm’s owner or the interaction of the owner with the 
government officials. 
Unlike other larger-sized enterprises, the owners of household businesses in Vietnam 
usually run their own businesses with a less formal management style and use more flexible 
sources, both paid and unpaid. Children and other members of the family in Vietnam are 
                                                       
14 Available at https://vietnamnews.vn/economy/379100/vn-looks-to-turn-home-firms-into-enterprises.html 
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important sources for household businesses, especially when the owners are female. They help 
to service clients or collect payments; overall, they contribute to reducing the cost by providing 
free labor (Poon et al., 2012). In addition, one of the reasons that motivates people to find more 
flexible work through self-employment is to better take care of their own families. So, the 
wealth of the household including the future career of household members is the main target 
of the owner, but the household members are also good sources for the development of the 
household business. Hence, a stronger background of the household can be a sustainable 
background for the business’s growth. Besides, the Vietnamese usually keep close 
relationships with neighbors or even people who live in the same commune; hence, the owners 
of household businesses can share knowledge, experiences or customers. The competition 
among household businesses is not as strong as that among larger-sized enterprises, so they 
receive more benefits with better or stronger networks. 
 
3.4 Methodology 
3.4.1 Models and variable measurement 
In order to figure out the influence of social capital on credit choices of household 
businesses, equations (1.1) and (1.2) are built. The first equation is used to test the impact of 
social capital on a firm’s choice to receive informal loans, and equation (1.2) is for testing the 
effect of social capital on a firm’s credit choice priority between informal and formal loans.  
 
(1.1) INFLOACHit = β0 + β1*SOCAPit + β2*CONTROLSit + eit 
(2.1) CRECHOPRIit = β0 + β1*SOCAPit + β2* CONTROLSit + eit 
 
We consider selection based on firms which actually need a loan; hence, we build an 
equation that identifies the differences between those who need and those who do not need 
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financial support. The standard equations (1.1 and 2.1) may produce the estimates with biasness 
and inconsistency, so we need to build the selection equations, which require the instrument 
that affects the need for a loan (for both formal and informal loan) but does not affect the 
decision to get an informal loan. It has been shown that in firms, household enterprises 
especially face financial constraints when they investigate new techniques or even introduce 
new products to the market (Hyytinen & Toivanen, 2005; Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Pham 
& Talavera, 2018). Hence, the innovation activities of the firm can be seen as the instrument 
which impacts whether the firms need to have a loan or not. In this study, the need for financial 
support is a binary variable, which equals 1 if the firm reports a need for loans and 0 otherwise; 
innovation is measured by a binary variable which equals one if the firm has introduced new 
technology or a new product and zero otherwise. Equations 1.2 and 2.2 below are the sample 
selection equations for both main Equations 1.1 and 2.1. 
 
(1.2 & 2.2) NEEDit = β0 + β1*SOCAPit + β2*CONTROLSit + β3*INNOit + eit 
 
For the effect of social capital on growth, equation (3) as below is used to test the 
following: 
 
(3) GROWTHit = β0 + β1*SOCAPit + β2* CONTROLSit + eit 
 
Informal loan choice (INFLOACH) is measured as a binary variable on whether the firm 
has an informal loan or not. It equals one if the firm has at least one informal loan and zero if 
the firm does not have any informal loan. Credit choice priority (CRECHOPRI) is set up as a 
binary variable, which is 1 if the firm thinks that informal loans are more important to the firm 
than formal ones and zero otherwise. Household business growth (GROWTH) is measured by 
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using two proxies, which are asset growth of household businesses (AGROWTH) and income 
growth of the households (IGROWTH). Asset growth (AGROWTH) is measured by the 
change in total assets between the beginning of the surveyed year and the beginning of the last 
two years from the surveyed year. Ordinal and binary variables are used to measure household 
income growth (IGROWTH). For the ordinal variable of household income growth 
(OIGROWTH), it equals zero if the household’s income decreases over the year; one if the 
household’s income keeps stable over the year; two if the household’s income increases by 0 
to 25% over the year; three if the household’s income increases by 25 to 50% over the year; 
four if the household’s income increases by 50 to 100% over the year and five if the 
household’s income increases over 100% over the year. The binary variable of household 
income growth (BIGROWTH) is one if the household’s income increases over the year and 
zero otherwise. Human capital includes household size (HSIZE), professional education of a 
firm’s owner (EDU) and the professional career experience of the household’s members 
(EXP). HSIZE is the number of members in a household of the firm’s owner that are aged 15 
and above, since they can help the owner in running the firm. EDU is a binary variable, with a 
value of one when the owner is educated professionally. Social networks include Communist 
Party membership (CPMEM) by the owner, the number of people in the social network 
(SOCNW), business association membership (BAMEM) and government assistance 
(GASSIS). We include owner age (OAGE), owner gender (OGENDER), firm age (FAGE), 
firm size (FSIZE) and labor force size (LABOR) as the control variables in this study. OAGE 
is the age of the owner of the household business (Markussen & Tarp, 2014); OGENDER is a 
binary variable, which equals one if the owner is male and zero if the owner is female. Older 
or female owners may prefer the traditional ways in running business; hence, they may think 
about formal loan first when they need external financing support (Markussen & Tarp, 2014). 
Besides that, larger or older firms can be more experienced in dealing with financial need, 
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which influences their credit choices. The labor force of household businesses, whom the 
owners can ask for informal loans, can be seen as the source for external financing. We also 
think those characteristics can also impact on the growth of household businesses. Accordingly, 
age and gender of owner affect the firm risk level; the firm risk level is smaller with a female 
owner compared with a male owner, in which matter in terms of firm performance and growth 
(Khan & Vieito, 2013). Larger and older firms tend to have lower growth opportunities than 
the younger and smaller ones; however, in household businesses, those with larger size and 
older age can have a more solid background for growth. Furthermore, labor force plays an 
important role in creating value for the firms. Table 3.1 shows the variable definitions in detail. 
 
[Insert Table 3.1 here] 
 
The topics of social capital and firm growth may need to deal with the problem of 
endogeneity. However, in the case of household businesses, this may not be a big problem. In 
the larger-sized enterprises where the director board tends to choose a CEO with better social 
networks in order to take the advantages from his/her networks, hence, the position of CEO 
can be changed. In household businesses, the owner runs his/her own business with a target of 
making profit for his/her own business and other related people inside the household (or even 
for society). Furthermore, social networks of household business owners are mostly affected 
by his/her own perception and characteristics, which are exogenous. Based on the special 
features of household businesses, we exclude the issue of endogeneity in this study. 
 
3.4.2 Data 
We use the data from surveys carried out in collaboration between the Institute of Labour 
Studies and Social Affairs (ILSSA) in the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs 
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(MOLISA) and Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen with funding from 
DAN- IDA in 2011, 2013 and 2015. We start with 4,971 firm-year observations including 
1,716 observations in 2011, 1,590 observations in 2013 and 1,665 observations in 2015. We 
eliminate 1,158 firm-year observations due to unavailable information, which leads to a final 
sample of 3,813 firm-year observations, which include 1,127 observations in 2011, 1,322 
observations in 2013 and 1,364 observations in 2015. Those household businesses are located 
at 9 provinces: Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Haiphong, Khanhhoa, Lamdong, Longan, Nghean, 
Phutho and Quangnam. 
Out of the 3,813 firm-year observations, 1,828 are located in urban areas including 
Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City and Haiphong, which accounted for 47.94%; 1,985 are from rural 
areas. Table 3.2 presents an overview of the sample with three panels. Panel A shows firm 
locations between urban vs. rural regions and among different provinces. Panel B draws a 
summary of firms by years and location, and panel C provides a description of unbalanced 
observations over years. 
 
[Insert Table 3.2 here] 
 
The table 3.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. We winsorized all 
continuous variables at 5% level. The table shows that 45% (1,726 firm-year observations) of 
total observations have at least one informal loan while 21% of total observations think that 
informal loans are more important than the formal ones. AGROWTH is on average about 24%. 
The average number of household members (HSIZE) is about 4 and only 14% of the owners 
have professional education background (EDU). The average number of social network people 
(SOCNW) of household businesses’ owners is about 27. Only 6% of the owners are the 
members of Communist Party (CPMEM) and only 4% of the owners are member of at least 
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one business association (BAMEM). Table 3.3 also indicates that only 8% of the total 
observations state that they receive assistance from the government (GASSIS). It is noteworthy 
that the local governments do not provide strong support for household businesses. 
 
[Insert Table 3.3 here] 
 
Pearson correlation coefficients are presented in Table 3.4. Both the micro and the macro 
level of SOCAP are correlated with INFLOACH, CRECHOPRI and GROWTH. While the 
correlation is positive for HSIZE, EDU and EXP; CPMEM is negatively correlated with 
INFLOACH, CRECHOPRI and GROWTH. SOCNW is positively correlated with 
INFLOACH and CRECHOPRI but negatively correlated with GROWTH. BAMEM is 
negatively correlated with INFLOACH, positively correlated with CRECHOPRI and does not 
correlate with GROWTH. GASSIS is negatively correlated with INFLOACH and GROWTH. 
Among control variables, FSIZE is positively correlated with all dependent variables while 
OAGE and FAGE are negatively correlated with INFLOACH and CRECHOPRI. OGENDER 
is positively correlated with CRECHOPRI. 
 
[Insert Table 3.4 here] 
 
3.5 Data analysis results 
3.5.1 Social capital and credit choices 
Table 3.5 displays the regression results for the various samples of the impact of social 
capital on credit choices of household businesses. For the regression, we rely on using 
Heckprobit estimations. The table comprises two panels: panel A for informal loan choice and 
panel B for credit choice priority between informal and formal loan.  
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Panel A of table 3.5 shows that the coefficients of HSIZE, EDU and EXP are positively 
significant. This is consistent with the expectation that firms with larger households are more 
likely to choose informal loans, because the pool of relatives as potential lenders is bigger. 
Besides, the positive coefficient of EDU and EXP indicates that a better educational 
background or even professional experience of the household members can help the owner to 
better understand the benefits of informal loans, especially for household businesses, so that 
again increases the probability of choosing informal loans when financial support is needed. 
The economic significance of the effect of an owner with professional education background 
is an increase of 64.66 percentage points of probability of choosing informal loans compared 
to the case of an owner without professional education background. Summing up, both levels 
of social capital affect the choice of informal loans. 
For the macro level of social capital, the results from panel A show that the coefficients 
of BAMEM and GASSIS are significantly negative, while the coefficient of SOCNW is 
significantly positive. The positive coefficient of SOCNW indicates that the probability of 
choosing informal loans increases with the size of the social network, because the firms may 
ask for informal loans from their social connections. In contrast, the negative coefficients of 
GASSIS and BAMEM are consistent with the idea that the better support from local 
governments or business associations in which the owner has the membership, the more help 
firms can get to receive formal loans from banks or other financial institutions. Membership in 
business associations can also be a good reference when the owners apply for bank loans, or 
the associations can help the owners to have better preparation for the bank loan applications. 
Hence, better support from the government or business association membership facilitate 
access to formal loans and therefore decrease the probability of choosing informal loans. In 
contrast, membership in the Communist Party does not influence on the probability of choosing 
informal loans, the coefficient is insignificant. 
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Among the control variables only LABOR is significantly positive. It is consistent with 
the expectation that firms with bigger labor force have higher probability of choosing informal 
loans. None of the other coefficients (OAGE, OGENDER, FAGE and FSIZE) is significant.  
Panel B of table 3.5 displays the impact of social capital on the credit choice priority 
between informal and formal loans using Heckprobit estimations. The results also confirm that 
both levels of social capital influence informal loan priority. The significantly positive 
regression coefficients of HSIZE, EDU and EXP are consistent with the expectation that bigger 
household size, stronger professional education background or better experience increase the 
probability of prioritizing informal loan choice.  In average, owners with a professional 
educational background increase the probability of prioritizing informal loans by 41.39 
percentage points. Panel B of table 3.5 also indicates that while the coefficient of CPMEM is 
significantly negativesignificantly negative, the coefficient of SOCNW is significantly 
positive. In average, Communist Party membership of owner can lower the probability of 
prioritizing informal loan choice by 50.21 percentage points in comparison with the case of 
owner without. In contrast, BAMEM and GASSIS do not affect the probability on informal 
loan choice priority.  
Only two of the control variables, namely OAGE and FSIZE, are significantly negative, 
whereas the coefficients of OGENDER, FAGE and LABOR are insignificant. We thus 
conclude that older owner owners and larger firms are less likely to choose informal loans. 
 
[Insert Table 3.5 here] 
 
3.5.2 Social capital and growth 
While the result in Tables 3.5 focused on loan choices, Table 3.6 presents the impact of 
social capital on growth. We measure growth by asset growth rate (AGROWTH) and 
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household income growth (IGROWTH) respectively. Accordingly, there are two panels: the 
first panel for social capital and asset growth and the second panel for social capital and 
household income growth, which is measured by two proxies: Income growth ordinal 
(OIGROWTH) and binary (BIGROWTH). 
In panel A of table 3.6, we find that all the coefficients on the micro level (HSIZE, EDU 
and EXP) are significantly positive whereas the coefficients on the macro level (CPMEM, 
SOCNW, BAMEM and GASSIS) are not significant. We therefore conclude that in household 
businesses the support from the household is more important for economic growth than their 
social networks and connections. The significantly positive coefficients of HSIZE, EDU and 
EXP are consistent with the expectation that firms with larger household size, owners with 
professional educational background or more work experience from household members can 
rely on more support, which translates into higher firm growth (AGROWTH). In contrast, the 
macro level of social capital does not increase the asset growth rate (AGROWTH). 
 
[Insert Table 3.6 here] 
 
Different from larger-sized enterprises, the main and final purpose of household 
enterprises is to provide income for the household itself. Hence, we continue to by looking at 
the household income growth – measured by binary and nominal variables – in panel B of table 
3.6. Again, we find that the micro level of social capital influences the growth of household 
income, while the macro level does not. The results are therefore consistent with those shown 
in panel A for asset growth: The coefficients of HSIZE, EDU and EXP are significantly 
positive and those of CPMEM, SOCNW, BAMEM and GASSIS are insignificant. An intuitive 
explanation is that the owners, with the help, support and encouragement of the members of 
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the household, will focus on maximizing benefit and wealth of the households, which translates 
into an increase in household income growth.  
For the control variables, in all estimation results, the coefficient of OAGE is 
significantly negative, thus younger owners may have a stronger motivation for firm growth 
and also for income growth of the household than older ones. The positive coefficient of FSIZE 
indicates that firms with more assets can have a more solid background to create more value, 
which contributes to higher household income growth. 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
Heckprobit estimations reveal that social capital impacts on a firm’s credit choices at 
both micro and macro levels. With the support of the members in the household, the firm’s 
owner can get informal loans from them. Besides, the number of network people and 
Communist Party membership of the firm’s owner can influence to the owner’s credit policy 
in choosing informal loans and also the priority choice between informal and formal loan. It 
can be explained that with stronger social networks, firms can easily ask for financial support 
from them. Moreover, firm’s owners with Communist Party membership can have stronger 
connections with the local governances, therefore, firms are more likely to have access to 
formal financial resources. 
It is interesting in the results that while both levels of social capital influence credit 
choices of household businesses, only the micro level of social capital assists in firm asset 
growth and household income growth. The members of the household can help the firm’s 
owner as internal resources with unpaid and better productivity labor force; they can even share 
their own professional experience in order to improve firm growth and the household’s wealth. 
The better education background of the owner can also support him/her in managing his/her 
own business with better innovation, new technologies or updated management styles. 
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This study does not focus on the benefits of informal or formal loans, with the belief that 
each type of loan has pros and cons and both are supporting firms with financial needs. Because 
household businesses are a special firm type with less formal business management and they 
live in the communes, social capital at micro and macro levels plays an important role in their 
business management styles and also their business’s growth.  
The resource dependence theory argues that while social capital brings to the enterprises 
many benefits, dependencies may also be created if the enterprises greatly depend on this 
resource. When we divide social capital into two different levels of micro and macro, 
household businesses may get risk-free benefits from their micro level of social capital since it 
is the support from their family members who have very close relationships with the owners. 
However, when the enterprises rely greatly on other resources outside the enterprises, they may 
need to face risks, and it can influence firm growth. Hence, the macro level of social capital 
can be seen as both a helping hand and grabbing hand for the enterprises. 
Overall, some implications may be drawn from this study since it gives a better 
understanding about household businesses in an emerging market and a network-oriented 
country like Vietnam. First, at a micro level, the firm should rely on the internal resources of 
the owner’s household since they are profitable and valuable. Second, at a macro level, 
government, financial institutions and other social associations should better support household 
businesses because they bring many benefits and value to the whole society. On the one hand, 
household businesses receive the informal support from household members; and vice versa, 
all the members benefit when the firm profits. And of course, if each individual gets better, the 
whole society is better. On another hand, household businesses are the first step or the 
foundation for the larger-sized enterprises in the future, which brings larger contributions to 
the economy. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 3.1 Variable definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
INFLOACH Binary variable 
1 if the firm has at least one informal loan and 0 otherwise. 
CRECHOPRI Binary variable 
1 if the firm thinks that informal loans are more important than formal loans and 0 if the 
firm thinks that formal loans are more important than informal loans. 
AGROWTH Asset growth 
It is measured by the change in total assets between the beginning of surveyed year and 
the beginning of the last two years from the surveyed year. 
BIGROWTH Income Growth (binary) 
1 if the household’s income increases over the year and 0 otherwise. 
OIGROWTH Income Growth (Ordinal) 
0 if the household’s income decreases over the year. 
1 if the household’s income keeps stable over the year. 
2 if the household’s income increases by 0-25% over the year. 
3 if the household’s income increases by 25-50% over the year. 
4 if the household’s income increases by 50-100% over the year. 
5 if the household’s income increases over 100% over the year. 
NEED Binary variable 
1 if the firm reports a need for a loan and 0 otherwise. 
OAGE The age of the firm’s owner 
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Table 3.1 (cont’d) 
 
Variable Name Definition 
OGENDER The gender of the firm’s owner 
1 for male, 0 for female. 
FAGE The age of firm. 
LABOR The number of employees of the firm. 
FSIZE The logarithm of the total asset. 
Social Capital: Micro Level - Human Capital 
HSIZE The number of members in the household of the firm’s owner. 
EDU Binary variable 
1 if the highest professional education completed of the firm’s owner is vocational 
college/college/university or higher and 0 if it is below. 
EXP The number of household members with professional full-time paid jobs. 
Social Capital: Macro Level - Social Networks 
CPMEM Binary variable 
1 if the firm’s owner is a member of the Communist Party, 0 otherwise. 
SOCNW The number of social network people who the firm’s owner has currently contacted and 
the connections are useful for the business operations. 
BAMEM Binary variable 
1 if the firm’s owner has the membership with at least one business association and 0 
otherwise. 
GASSIS Binary variable 
1 if the firm receives assistance from government and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 3.2 Sample description 
 
Panel A. Firms by location 
 
Firm 
location 
Urban Ha Noi 
Ho Chi Minh 
city 
Haiphong 
Number 1828 948 648 232 
% 47.94 24.86 16.99 6.08 
 
Firm location Rural Khanh Hoa Lam Dong Long An Nghe An Phu Tho Quang Nam 
Number 1985 144 138 243 642 500 318 
% 55.76 3.78 3.62 6.37 16.84 13.11 8.34 
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Panel B. Firms by year and location 
 
Year 
Ha 
Noi 
Ho Chi 
Minh city 
Hai 
Phong 
Khanh 
Hoa 
Lam 
Dong 
Long 
An 
Nghe 
An 
Phu 
Tho 
Quang 
Nam 
Total 
2011 291 173 70 48 32 69 215 137 92 1127 
2013 308 221 82 51 49 82 235 180 114 1322 
2015 349 254 80 45 57 92 192 183 112 1364 
Total 948 648 232 144 138 243 642 500 318 3813 
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Panel C. Unbalanced observations over years 
 
Number of firms 2011 2013 2015 
771 x x x 
335  x x 
154 x x  
12 x  x 
246   x 
190 x   
62  x  
Total 1,127 1,322 1,364 
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Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
INFLOACH 0.45 0.5 0 1 
CRECHOPRI 0.21 0.41 0 1 
AGROWTH 0.24 0.76 -0.685 3.463 
OIGROWTH 1.16 1.54 0 5 
BIGROWTH 0.33 0.47 0 1 
HSIZE 4.21 1.09 2 10 
EDU 0.14 0.35 0 1 
EXP 1.87 0.78 0 6 
CPMEM 0.06 0.24 0 1 
SOCNW 27.55 15.71 7 66 
BAMEM 0.04 0.2 0 1 
GASSIS 0.08 0.28 0 1 
OAGE 53.43 9.05 38 70 
OGENDER 0.66 0.47 0 1 
FAGE 22.45 7.92 5 40 
LABOR 7.11 5.05 2 19 
FSIZE 1,663.1 1,885.5 58.6 7,235 
Notes:  
For variable definitions: see Table 3.1. 
*, **, *** for statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Firm size is total assets in million VND. 
All variables are winsorized at the 5% level.
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Table 3.4 Correlation coefficients 
 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 INFLOACH 1                 
2 CRECHOPRI 0.23 
*** 
1                
3 AGROWTH 0.07 
*** 
0.09 
*** 
1               
4 OIGROWTH 0.09 
*** 
0.1 
*** 
0.62 
*** 
1              
5 BIGROWTH 0.08 
*** 
0.09 
*** 
0.76 
*** 
0.89 
*** 
1             
6 HSIZE 0.07 
*** 
0.21 
*** 
0.2 
*** 
0.39 
*** 
0.33 
*** 
1            
7 EDU 0.11 
*** 
0.12 
*** 
0.25 
*** 
0.25 
*** 
0.26 
*** 
0.13 
*** 
1           
8 EXP 0.14 
*** 
0.21 
*** 
0.22 
*** 
0.37 
*** 
0.32 
*** 
0.31 
*** 
0.22 
*** 
1          
9 CPMEM -0.07 
*** 
-0.07 
*** 
-0.06 
*** 
-0.09 
*** 
-0.09 
*** 
-0.04 
*** 
-0.05 
*** 
-0.09 
*** 
1         
10 SOCNW 0.13 
*** 
0.13 
*** 
-0.07 
*** 
-0.08 
*** 
-0.08 
*** 
0.03 
** 
0.03 
* 
0.07 
*** 
0.029 
* 
1        
11 BAMEM -0.03 
*** 
0.08 
*** 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.07 
*** 
0.01 1       
12 GASSIS -0.08 
*** 
0.002 -0.07 
*** 
-0.08 
*** 
-0.08 
*** 
-0.05 
*** 
-0.02 -0.05 
*** 
0.28 
*** 
0.02 0.3 
*** 
1      
13 OAGE -0.07 
*** 
-0.13 
*** 
0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.06 
*** 
-0.01 0.08 
*** 
0.13 
*** 
-0.03 
** 
0.02 0.04 
** 
1     
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Table 3.4 (cont’d) 
 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
14 OGENDER 0.01 0.03 
** 
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05 
*** 
-0.01 0.05 
*** 
-0.06 
*** 
0.00 0.01 0.04 
** 
1    
15 FAGE -0.07 
*** 
-0.05 
*** 
-0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 
*** 
-0.04 
*** 
0.04 
*** 
0.03 
** 
-0.02 0.02 0.04 
** 
0.33 
*** 
-0.03 1   
16 LABOR 0.17 
*** 
0.11 
*** 
0.01 0.03 
* 
0.02 0.01 0.04 
*** 
0.06 
*** 
-0.03 
** 
0.05 
*** 
0.11 
*** 
-0.01 -0.03 
* 
0.02 -0.05 
*** 
1  
17 FSIZE 0.1 
*** 
0.05 
*** 
0.09 
*** 
0.06 
*** 
0.06 
*** 
0.03 0.08 
*** 
0.07 
*** 
-0.02 0.06 
*** 
0.06 
*** 
0.00 0.07 
*** 
0.06 
*** 
-0.05 
*** 
0.37 
*** 
1 
Notes:  
For variable definitions: see Table 3.1. 
*, **, *** for statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 5% lev
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Table 3.5 Estimation results: Social capital and credit choices 
 
Panel A. Social capital and informal loan choice 
 
Model # (1) (2) 
D. V. INFLOACH 
  Coef.  p-value Coef. p-value 
HSIZE 0.0701** 0.011   
EDU 0.6466*** 0.000   
EXP 0.0903** 0.022   
CPMEM   -0.1656 0.185 
SOCNW   0.0183*** 0.000 
BAMEM   -0.1892* 0.073 
GASSIS   -0.2897** 0.012 
OAGE -0.0034 0.314 -0.0026 0.432 
OGENDER -0.0845 0.145 -0.0847 0.145 
FAGE -0.0042 0.272 -0.0059 0.127 
LABOR 0.0272*** 0.001 0.0282*** 0.000 
FSIZE -0.0436 0.116 -0.0236 0.398 
Province controls  Yes   Yes  
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Panel A (cont’d) 
 
Selection equation instrument  NEED   NEED  
INNO 0.5073*** 0.000 0.5109*** 0.000 
Selectivity Correction 
LR test of indep. Eqns. (rho = 0) 9.00*** 0.002 16.59*** 0.000 
Wald chi2 for sig. of augmented regression 41.63*** 0.000 33.71** 0.013 
Obs 2689 2689 
Notes:  
For variable definitions: see Table 3.1. 
*, **, *** for statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 5% level. 
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Panel B. Social capital and credit choice priority 
 
Model # (3) (4) 
D. V. CRECHOPRI 
 Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
HSIZE 0.6575*** 0.000   
EDU 0.4139*** 0.000   
EXP 0.1982*** 0.003   
CPMEM   -0.5021*** 0.000 
SOCNW   0.0264*** 0.000 
BAMEM   0.0512 0.603 
GASSIS   -0.1020 0.315 
OAGE -0.0169*** 0.002 -0.0088*** 0.008 
OGENDER -0.0146 0.870 -0.0089 0.879 
FAGE 0.0044 0.454 -0.0025 0.496 
LABOR 0.0091 0.281 0.0005 0.930 
FSIZE -0.1026** 0.020 -0.0012 0.964 
Province controls Yes Yes 
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Panel B (cont’d) 
 
Selection equation instrument NEED NEED 
INNO 0.5327*** 0.000 0.5225*** 0.000 
Selectivity Correction 
LR test of indep. Eqns.  
(rho = 0) 
5.28** 0.021 22.37*** 0.000 
Wald chi2 for sig. of 
augmented regression 
86.50*** 0.000 149.45*** 0.000 
Obs 2689 2689 
Notes:  
For variable definitions: see Table 3.1. 
*, **, *** for statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
All variables are winsorized at the 5% level. 
 
  
 135 
Table 3.6 Estimation results: Social capital and growth 
 
Panel A. Social capital and asset growth 
 
Model # (1) (2) 
D. V. AGROWTH 
 Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
HSIZE 0.0889*** 0.000   
EDU 0.3458*** 0.000   
EXP 0.0613*** 0.000   
CPMEM   -0.0144 0.733 
SOCNW   -0.0007 0.308 
BAMEM   -0.0304 0.563 
GASSIS   -0.0485 0.217 
OAGE -0.0034** 0.010 -0.0042*** 0.002 
OGENDER 0.006 0.801 0.017 0.487 
FAGE 0.0004 0.775 0.0001 0.991 
LABOR -0.0046* 0.066 -0.0036 0.158 
FSIZE 0.1068*** 0.000 0.1208*** 0.000 
Year controls Yes Yes 
Province controls Yes Yes 
Observation 3813 3813 
R Squared/Pseudo R 
Squared 
0.1854 0.1307 
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Panel A (Cont’d) 
 
   
F 36.94*** 24.20*** 
Prob > F 0.000 0.00 
 Notes:  
For variable definitions: see Table 3.1. 
*, **, *** for statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
p-values based on standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity. 
All variables are winsorized at the 5% level. 
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Panel B. Social capital and household income growth 
 
Model # (3) (4) (5) (6) 
D. V. OIGROWTH BIGROWTH 
 Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
HSIZE 0.2911*** 0.000   0.8339*** 0.000   
EDU 0.4043*** 0.000   0.7405*** 0.000   
EXP 0.1933*** 0.000   0.5757*** 0.000   
CPMEM   -0.094 0.320   -0.141 0.481 
SOCNW   -0.0005 0.692   -0.0008 0.751 
BAMEM   -0.0832 0.417   -0.0942 0.659 
GASSIS   -0.0211 0.802   -0.025 0.887 
OAGE -0.0065*** 0.005 -0.0073*** 0.001 -0.0187*** 0.001 -0.0178*** 0.000 
OGENDER 0.0341 0.405 0.0455 0.260 0.1423 0.137 0.135 0.113 
FAGE 0.0035 0.195 0.0029 0.274 0.0036 0.556 0.0015 0.787 
LABOR -0.0031 0.452 -0.0015 0.709 -0.004 0.663 0.0008 0.929 
FSIZE 0.1073*** 0.000 0.1276*** 0.000 0.1972*** 0.000 0.2270*** 0.000 
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observation 3813 3813 3813 3813 
R Squared/Pseudo R Squared 0.1296 0.0814 0.3316 0.1808 
Wald Chi2 1485.95*** 855.54*** 1023.55*** 735.19*** 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Notes:  
For variable definitions: see Table 1. 
*, **, *** for statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
p-values based on standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
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This dissertation has analyzed three aspects of firm governance in Vietnam. Those aspects are 
corruption (chapter 1), political connections (chapter 2) and social capital (chapter 3). Those aspects 
are linked other factors discussed in the dissertation, such as the business environment, and 
ownership.  
The chapters are also linked with each other, where the relation between corruption and 
political connection is twofold. (i) On the one hand, it can serve as a substitute for political 
connections, i.e. the advantages that some firms have through formal or informal ties with the 
governments can also be achieved by corruption. (ii) On the other hand, we can assume a feedback 
between political connections and corruptions in the sense that firms with political connections can 
allow to be more resistant against the need to take part in corruption, which would lead to a negative 
relation between them in the spirit of consideration (i). Or political connections could increase the 
readiness to be involved in corruption since it allows the politically linked firm staff to withdraw 
money from the firm for private purposes. The latter implies a positive relation between corruption 
and political connections.  
The answer which effect dominates is rather an empirical one, and beyond the scope of the 
dissertation. We leave it to future research on the topic. 
Chapter 3 looks at social capital. We split up social capital into two components, a micro and 
a macro component, where the latter includes factors such as business association membership, 
communist party membership, government assistance and social network activities. Those factors 
refer to the previous chapters and directly address political connections and to some extent also 
corruption. 
While the dissertation’s title is ‘Governance and Firm Efficiency in Vietnam’, the reader may 
be surprised that efficiency is not directly addressed in the text. It is, however, implicitly present 
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throughout the whole dissertation, since corruption and political connections are known main 
constraints for firm efficiency in emerging economies.  
 
4.1 Summary of the individual research projects 
In the first research project, we investigate the impact of corruption on firm growth in Vietnam 
to answer the question that why corruption brings many negative effects to the whole economy, but 
it does still exist in the economy for such a long time at a very high level? In order to answer the 
question, the study figures out that while corruption harms firm growth of shareholding (SHEs), 
foreign-owned (FOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs), it helps SOEs in increasing 
their growth. These results corroborate with agency theory. Corruption, which is known as bribery 
money, may lead to information asymmetry and, therefore, an increase in agency costs along with a 
decrease in firm growth. Conversely, a statistically significant positive relationship between 
corruption and the growth of SOEs, and non-SHEs can be explained that a good relationship with 
government provides SOEs and non-SHEs with advantages. While SOEs in Vietnam are known as 
the ones who have very strong relationships with the Vietnamese Government; managers of SOEs 
are also known as politicians, and therefore, SOEs can benefit from their connections and of course, 
they have to pay for that. For non-SHEs and non-FOEs, they may face agency problems; hence, the 
more they pay, the bigger the advantages they get. 
We also document that the difference in the levels of corruption across different provinces can 
be influenced by the quality of the local business environment, which is measured by the provincial 
competitiveness index (PCI); but again, those impacts are heterogeneous in firms with different 
ownership identities. 
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In the second research project, we provide the influence of political connections on firm value 
of listed firms in Vietnam by splitting up political connections (PCs) into two different types, namely 
acquired and ascribed ones. We find that although firms with both ascribed and acquired PCs have 
lower firm value (FV) than firms without any PCs; firms with acquired PCs exhibit better FV than 
those with ascribed PCs. The study also reveals that concentrated ownership (CO) has a moderation 
impact on the association between acquired PCs and FV while it can help firms with acquired PCs 
in improving FV. 
Emerging economies are known for weak rules of law, weak regulatory environment, poor 
investor protection and high level of corruption. Hence, in those economies, the business elites 
potentially exploit their political linkages to influence the system in accumulating their own wealth 
at the expense of general shareholders (Li et al., 2008; Mutakin et al., 2015). Hence, politically 
connected firms in any case, especially acquired politically connected firms, have to make or bear 
the informal payments or the informal cost of creating or maintaining connections with politicians. 
Moreover, SOEs in emerging economies, especially in Vietnam, are always part of the political 
system (Nguyen, 2003) and enjoy many priorities (Nguyen, 2006). They typically claim a 
disproportionate share of national investment in land, property and physical assets resulting in a less 
than proportionate increase in enterprise performance (Minor et al., 2017); and also resulting in low 
firm efficiency. The political and bureaucratic interference together with state ownership have made 
SOE’s control and monitor systems for political interest rather than effectiveness; that is the reason 
why SOEs, which are known as firms with ascribed PCs, have weaker motives to pursue profit and 
efficiency than those in privately-owned firms. 
Although informal expenses can rise in acquired politically connected firms, it cannot be 
denied that firms can receive many benefits from their connections with political powers. In the case 
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that firms can lower the costs brought from PCs and maximize the benefit, which they can get from 
their PCs, firms can get the advantages. In this study, we find that with CO, acquired politically 
connected firms can have better FV than those with diffuse ownership and also firms without any 
PCs. It can be explained that in firms with diffuse ownership, acquired PCs can cause an increase in 
agency problems along with agency costs due to asymmetric information; but in contrast, acquired 
politically connected firms with CO can avoid the increase of agency problem. Moreover, CO can 
help acquired politically connected firms focusing more on maximizing profits or advantages they 
can get from their PCs. In developed markets, a strong institutional setting and strong corporate 
governance may help shareholders in monitoring the PCs; but in emerging economies, with the 
absence of a strong institutional environment and strong corporate governance, political agents may 
engage in wealth expropriation at the expense of other shareholders, especially minority 
shareholders. 
In the third research project, we figure out the effect of social capital on credit choices and 
growth of household businesses. In this study, social capital is considered at different levels: micro 
for human capital and macro for social networks. We consider social network including Communist 
Party membership, the size of the social network, business association membership and government 
assistance for household businesses. It concludes that while both levels of social capital influence 
on credit choices of household businesses; only the micro level of social capital plays an important 
role in improving the household business’s growth including both asset and income growth. 
The results reveal that social capital affects firm’s credit choices at both micro and macro 
levels. With the support of the members in the household, the firm’s owner can get informal loans 
from them. Besides, the size of the network and Communist Party membership of firm’s owner can 
influence to the owner’s credit policy in choosing informal loan and also the priority choice between 
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informal and formal loan. It can be explained that with stronger social networks, firms can easily 
ask for financial support from them. Moreover, in case that firm’s owners are the members of 
Communist Party, firms are more likely to access to formal financial resources. 
It is an interesting result that, while both levels of social capital influence on credit choices of 
household businesses, only the micro level of social capital can explain firm growth. The members 
of the household can help the firm’s owner as internal resources with unpaid and better productivity 
labor force or even sharing their own professional experience in order to improve firm growth and 
household wealth. The better educational background of the owner can also support him/her in 
managing his/her own business with better innovation, new technologies or more sophisticated 
management techniques. This can be explained by resource independence theory that social capital 
is a helping hand of the enterprises but dependencies may also be created. With the micro level of 
social capital, firms may benefit at a low risk, but they need to face problems of independence from 
their resources if they much depend on the macro level of social capital. 
 
4.2 Practical implications 
In addition to contributing to the academic literature, the findings in this dissertation may be 
of interest for practitioners. 
The results of the first research project confirm that corruption is a big problem of developing 
countries since it may harm economic growth, especially for the growth of shareholding and foreign-
owned enterprises but it favors the growth of state-owned enterprises. Managers from emerging 
countries can learn from this research that bribery creates information asymmetry, which decrease 
firm growth. Besides that, the results also show that good quality of the local business environment 
can help shareholding and foreign-owned enterprises to avoid of making informal payment when 
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state-owned enterprises even need to pay more to get benefits. This implies that the local business 
environment, plays an important role in combating corruption. This is also a lesson for the 
Vietnamese Government in pushing for reforms to reduce time consuming and wasteful 
administrative procedures in order to improve the quality of business environment to reduce 
corruption. 
The results of the second research project show that both cases of ascribed and acquired 
political connections have negative impacts on firm value but acquired political connected firms 
with concentrated ownership can exhibit a higher firm value than others. Managers can learn from 
this research that political connections do not bring firms with just benefits but also costs that harm 
the firm value.  
The results of the third research project show that both levels of social capital have an impact 
on credit choices of household business in Vietnam including informal loan choice and credit choice 
priority between informal and formal loans; however, only the micro level of social capital plays an 
important role in improving the growth of household businesses. The owners of the household can 
learn from this research that the household itself can be the good resource for the household business 
with free labor, better productivity, sources for external financing, etc. The results also suggest that 
the local governments in Vietnam y should have better support for household businesses since this 
sector creates a huge value and has substantially contributes to society.   
 
4.3 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
The three empirical chapters of this dissertation are not without limitations. These may have 
partially affected the accuracy of the results presented or can be the reasons why some of the results 
were not statistically significant.  
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First, we use the data from the enterprise surveys of World Bank for the first research project 
and surveys carried out in collaboration between the Institute of Labour Studies and Social Affairs 
(ILSSA) in the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) and the Department of 
Economics, University of Copenhagen, for the third research project. However, the financial 
information is limited, which may have some impact on the results. An interesting avenue for future 
research would be using databases with better financial information since this would allow to have 
more precise measures for firm performance.  
Second, there are non-linear effects between political connections and firm value if we can use 
the measure with different degrees of political connections. However, it is not easy to build up an 
index for political connections, which can be used in non-linear regression models. Future research 
can develop an index with different degrees of political connections to give a broader picture about 
the effects of political connections. 
Third, we measure corruption based on the perception of firms regarding whether they need to 
make informal payments and the judgment about how corrupt the local business and industrial 
environments are, rather than the actual level of corruption that firms face. It means that corruption 
is measured at firm-perceived level since the actual level is difficult to measure. Another venue for 
future research that could be promising is to explore the impact of corruption on growth at actual 
firm level. 
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